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ABSTRACT 
States compare asylum and immigration policies with one 
another.  The Israeli immigration and asylum regime influenced 
American law, and was also directly influenced by it.  This Article 
offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the Israeli case law 
on the rights of undocumented entrants, at the core of which is a 
series of cases on immigration detention.  Three times within a two 
year period, the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated immigration 
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detention laws and the legislature complied with increasing 
frustration.  Our argument is that although the Court courageously 
protected the undocumented entrants’ rights, it also resorted to 
strategic ambiguity as a means of institutional survival in light of 
legislative threats to incorporate a general legislative override clause 
and executive attempts to “pack” the Court with conservative 
justices through appointments.  This high-stakes dialogue is 
unprecedented in the Israeli context and uncommon in comparative 
law.  We argue that courts must not only protect the constitutional 
and international human rights of undocumented entrants, but also 
bring the political branches to accountability.  They should force 
states to conduct refugee status determinations in a timely manner 
rather than be satisfied with temporary protection regimes.  They 
should further recognize that rights may accumulate as a result of a 
prolonged presence of an undocumented entrant in a country.  The 
Article discusses the Israeli judicial techniques used to reduce the 
conflict with the representative branches, including the use of 
constitutional avoidance and comparative law, and juxtaposes them 
with the American approach evident in Zadvydas v. Davis and 
Jennings v. Rodriguez.   The harsh implications of a policy that leaves 
people in an indeterminate state of mere protection from removal 
are manifest in the Israeli story and should serve as a warning to the 
U.S. courts as they formulate their reaction to the recent asylum ban. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of immigrants in general and asylum seekers in 
particular is hotly contested around the world and is the subject of 
parliamentary and presidential election campaigns.1  The Western 
world is awakening to a new age of protectionism, exclusion and 
border control in light of the rising and massive waves of migration 
of immigrants and asylum seekers worldwide.2  As states fight 
against immigration, they turn to each other for “inspiration” on the 
most effective means of exclusion.  Similarly, domestic courts often 
adopt each other’s standards of interpretation when they delineate 
states’ obligations under international immigration law.  Therefore, 
a comparative approach to immigration law is beneficial to the 
understanding of how both representative branches and courts 
operate. 
Israel, too, is currently coping with a population of 
undocumented entrants.  Within a few years (primarily 2006–2013), 
about 65,000 undocumented entrants arrived in Israel—a country 
roughly the size of the state of New Jersey3—with a population of 
8,796,200 residents4 and a territory of 8,630 sq. miles,5 through the 
State’s southern border with Egypt.  Israel is surrounded by a 
number of countries with which it maintains tense to conflictual 
relations, through which the migrants have crossed.  While the 
nationality of undocumented entrants varied, approximately 70% 
are from Eritrea and about 20% from Sudan.6  Hundreds of 
 
 1 See, e.g., Lewis Davis & Sumit S. Deole, Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right 
Parties in Europe, 15 IFO DICE REPORT–J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 10, 10 
(2017); Martin Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, & Joseph Zweimüller, Immigration and 
Voting for the Far Right, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1341 (2017) (discussing the increase 
in support of right wing parties following an inflow of immigrants into a 
neighborhood). 
 2 See STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: 
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (4th ed. 2009). 
 3 See Quick Facts: New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NJ/PST045218# 
[https://perma.cc/9M92-CSYT] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
 4 Demographic Characteristics, ISR. CENT. BUREAU STAT. (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=403 
[https://perma.cc/6EWB-KNDT]. 
 5 See Israel—Size and Dimension, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (2013), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel-Size-and-
Dimension.aspx [https://perma.cc/55QM-UYKQ]. 
 6 See Data on Foreigners in Israel, POPULATION & IMMIGR. AUTHORITY 7 (Jan. 
2018), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3
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thousands of the nationals of these two African dictatorships have 
fled and sought refuge in different countries around the world.7 
This Article examines Israel’s policy towards people who 
entered the State in an undocumented manner, through a non-
recognized border crossing point.  It argues that Israel refrained for 
many years from deciding whether these individuals are entitled to 
refugee protection, and that the Court enabled the State to get away 
with it.  Indeed, there is no agreement on the reason for the entry of 
these persons into Israel.  The undocumented entrants argue that 
they are refugees, and the State cannot return them to their home 
countries for fear of persecution on political, ethnic or religious 
grounds.8  On the other hand, the State argues that these people by 
and large are seeking to improve their economic conditions, and 
does not interpret the definition of “refugee” in international law to 
 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/foreign
ers_in_Israel_data_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MMU-XRSY] (in Hebrew) 
[hereinafter 2018 Data of PIA]. 
 7 See File: First Instance Decisions by Outcome and Recognition Rates, 30 Main 
Citizenships of Asylum Applicants Granted Decisions in the EU-28, 4th Quarter 2016, 
EUROSTAT: STAT. EXPLAINED (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recogn
recog_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_t
ht_EU-28,_4th_quarter_2016.png [https://perma.cc/XMS6-BPPA]. 
 8 Eritreans primarily argue that they fled army service, or the mandatory draft 
of 18 months that might lead to indefinite army service, in conditions amounting to 
slavery.  If Israel returns them to Eritrea after fleeing army service, they argue that 
they might be subject to torture or even death.  See, e.g., File No. 1010-14 Appeals 
Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of Interior (Feb. 15, 2018), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter Mesegene Case].  They 
further argue that they could not have enjoyed refugee protection in Egypt, even 
though they passed through it on their way to Israel, since it was not a safe country 
for them.  Egypt has executed a few asylum seekers, tortured and detained others 
and returned people to Eritrea where they suffered further persecution.  Israel was 
the first safe country in which they arrived and could seek refuge.  Sudanese 
primarily argue that they fled the genocide in Darfur or civil war.  See, e.g., Sinai 
Perils: Risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Egypt and Israel, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Nov. 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt1108webwcover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NKS-ZWAE].  Both groups demand that the State, which is a 
party to the 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the additional protocol (Refugee Convention), respect its international obligations 
to refugees.  See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.  They 
should thus receive protection and access to rights in Israel. 
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include them.9  As a result, only a few are recognized as refugees, 
and the rest—those who never applied for asylum, those whose 
asylum applications were never determined, and those whose 
asylum applications were denied—had received a temporary 
group-based protection from refoulement to their states of origin.10  
We will therefore refer to these individuals as “undocumented 
entrants”, people who entered in an undocumented way but their 
presence in the country is documented, intentionally refraining from 
using the derogatory language of illegality or the legitimizing 
language of refugees.  We do so despite our inclination to believe 
that many of these individuals are refugees.  We use this term for 
 
 9 With regard to Eritreans, Israel argues that fleeing army service is not a cause 
for refugee status in and of itself, unless the person can further show that he will be 
individually persecuted on political grounds.  See Uri Tal, Infiltrators and Asylum 
Seekers from Sudan in Israel—Submitted to the Interior and Environmental Protection 
Committee of the Knesset, THE KNESSET’S CENTER FOR RESEARCH & INFORMATION (June 
19, 2007).  With regard to Sudanese, the State claims that as Sudan is an enemy state, 
it is not obliged to grant its nationals asylum.  It further claims that Israel was not 
the first safe country that the Sudanese passed by after fleeing their home country.  
Egypt, for example, which almost all Sudanese had crossed through, was willing to 
grant some refugee status.  On the dispute between the parties, see File No. 8665/14 
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset para. 4 (Aug. 11, 2015) 
(Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 10 See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  
Currently, Eritreans enjoy an unofficial temporary group protection—recognized 
in judicial decisions, though not anchored in official government decisions or 
legislation, while Sudanese are not returned primarily because of lack of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, in addition to the recognition of the hardship 
they would likely experience, if returned.  See State Comptroller’s Annual Report 
68c, Chapter 2: On Minister of Interior—The Population and Immigration 
Authority: The Treatment of Political Asylum Seekers in Israel, 1428, n. 19 (May 
2018) (in Hebrew) [hereinafter State Comptroller 2018 Report], 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_627/8eaa80a0-a426-4424-aefa-
8fdc4e8b176a/221-zarim-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GZX-XZQD].  PIA issued only 
short-term documents, which grant them a fragile status with very few rights, and 
force them to constantly renew their papers in lengthy bureaucratic processes.  The 
State granted them temporary stay status lasting between two to four months.  
Lately, in October 2019, the Minister of Interior decided to lengthen the period to 
last between half a year to a year each time.  See Orly Harrari, Improvements to 
Infiltrators from Eritrea and Sudan, ISR. NAT’L NEWS (Mar. 3, 2018), 
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/367608 [https://perma.cc/NPJ4-
9RRQ].  The State denied them any option of naturalization; Yuval Livnat, Refugees 
and Permanent Status in Asylum State, in WHERE LEVINSKI MEETS ASMARA: ASYLUM 
SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN ISRAEL – SOCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 343 (Tally Kritzman-
Amir ed., 2015) (in Hebrew); see also infra note 40. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3
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the sake of caution, since most of them did not undergo Refugee 
Status Determination (RSD) on their individual cases.11 
Israel’s struggles with undocumented entry and its immigration 
and asylum policy regime are closely studied by the Trump 
administration.  Thus, for example, the erection of a Southern border 
fence along Israel’s border with Egypt, which effectively blocked 
almost all undocumented entry into the country, is offered as proof 
to the feasibility of this plan on the U.S.’ Mexican border.12  The 
American travel ban has an antecedent counter-part in Israel’s 
policy, banning entry of nationals of certain enemy countries, 
including a ban on the entrance of young Palestinians from the West 
 
 11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR’s 
Position on the Status of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals Defined as ‘Infiltrators’ 
by Israel (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter 2017 UNHCR position], 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html [https://perma.cc/7D2R-
GX39].  According to Daniel Solomon, the Legal Adviser of the Population and 
Immigration Authority (PIA), in the discussions of the Interior and Protection of 
Environment Committee of the Israeli legislature (Knesset) in November 2017: 
“Eritreans submitted 9,189 applications for asylum since 2007.  Israel decided 5,050 
cases and 4,139 cases are still pending.  Ten Eritreans received refugee status.  
Sudanese submitted 3,170 applications.  Israel decided 1,494 cases and 1,676 cases 
are still pending.  Only one Sudanese person received a refugee status.”  Protocol 
no. 508 of Interior and Environment Protection Committee, 28 (Nov. 27, 2017), 
http://m.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=laws
uggestionssearch&lawitemid=2023509; see also Press Release of the Interior 
Committee on Infiltrators Law (Nov. 19, 2017), 
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/InternalAffairs/News/Pages/2
91117.aspx# [https://perma.cc/FJ6Z-3RDD].  Cf. 2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at 
1 (noting that between 2013 and 2017, 9,539 Eritreans and 4,559 Sudanese applied 
for asylum in Israel).  See 2017 UNHCR position, 1 (Nov. 2017), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html [https://perma.cc/7D2R-
GX39] (noting that the asylum applications submitted, 3,567 Eritreans and 3,870 
Sudanese, had pending applications in June 2017).  It is not clear why there are 
discrepancies in the data.  This data means that Israel recognized less than 0.1% of 
those applying for asylum from Sudan and Eritrea as refugees.  Many did not 
submit official applications for asylum out of lack of confidence in the process.  Id. 
at 1–2.  Israel also granted 500 Sudanese from Darfur temporary residence status 
based on humanitarian grounds.  This status grants fewer rights than a refugee 
status since these people are not entitled to bring their immediate family members 
to Israel.  See State Comptroller 2018 Report, supra note 10, at 1448–49.  According 
to the Comptroller, between 2009 and 2017, the Minister of Interior granted refugee 
status to 52 out of 55,433 seekers of asylum in Israel.  Eight of these recognized 
refugees are from Eritrea and one from Darfur.  Id. at 1436, 1447. 
 12 Except for a few dozens of people who entered Israel in 2015 despite the 
barrier, there were no entries through the Egyptian border since 2013.  A MAJORITY 
STAFF REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, 115TH CONG., SECURING ISRAEL: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM A NATION UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF ATTACK (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
SECURING ISRAEL]. 
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Bank into Israel, even for family unification purposes, and an 
exclusion of enemy nations from the asylum system.13 
Additionally, we show that not only has Israel influenced U.S. 
immigration policy, but the Israeli Supreme Court has explicitly 
relied upon U.S. law, and primarily the Zadvydas v. Davis decision, 
to develop Israeli immigration detention law, albeit in a problematic 
way.14  While the confrontation between the courts and the 
representative branches over the treatment of undocumented 
entrants heated in the U.S. primarily since Trump’s election, 15 the 
Israeli drama has been unfolding since 2007.  The successes and 
failures of the Israeli judicial policy and strategies in protecting 
rights of undocumented entrants should thus be studied carefully 
by anyone interested in understanding the stakes involved. 
The Israeli debate regarding the treatment of these 
undocumented entrants is conducted along deeply emotional lines 
as well.  According to its Declaration of Independence, Israel was 
founded after the Second World War, as the nation state for the 
Jewish people, many of whom survived the Holocaust, leading 
many of its people to know a thing or two about persecution and 
seeking asylum.  For a lot of them, their personal or family histories 
include seeking refuge.  Many are well-familiar with the harsh 
consequences and the inevitable losses of a merciless world turning 
a blind eye to human misery.16  In fact, this awareness of the 
importance of the surrogate protection to refugees, was precisely the 
reason for Israel’s active involvement in the drafting process of the 
Refugee Convention.17  Yet, many in the Israeli society raise 
(justified or unjustified) concerns about the impact of this 
undocumented migration, mostly along the lines of demography, 
 
 13 See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior, 61 P.D. 202 (2006) (Isr.); 
HCJ 466/07 MK Zahava Galon v. Attorney General, 65(2) PD 44 (2012) (Isr.); Tally 
Kritzman-Amir & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Nationality Bans, U. ILL. L. REV. 563 (2019). 
 14 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 15 Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks 
‘Obama Judge’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-
rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/U3GQ-Y3PX]. 
 16 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE 1 (May 14, 1948), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm. 
 17 File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, 
para. 13 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Melcer, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, 
in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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economy, sovereignty, and security.18  In particular, there is concern 
over the fact that these persons reside primarily in under-developed 
neighborhoods.  While some welcome the migrants to those 
neighborhoods, others from the native residents vocally object to 
having to share their already-lacking infrastructure and social 
services with the migrants, as the responsibility to the integration of 
these undocumented entrants is unevenly shared by the Israeli 
population.19 
Due to these concerns, and for potentially many other reasons, 
Israel adopted numerous exclusionary practices with regard to 
undocumented entrants.  Israel has erected a fence along the 
Egyptian border,20 which blocked virtually all undocumented 
entries since 2013.21  It placed the undocumented entrants in 
immigration detention, enacting provisions to allow prolonged 
detention periods22 and other forms of limitations on the freedom of 
movement such as a forced residence of some of the men in a 
designated center23 and geographical restrictions on movement and 
employment.24  Israel signed agreements with third-party countries 
to remove these undocumented entrants to their territories.25  The 
State imposed economic restrictions on undocumented entrants, 
 
 18 See, e.g., Elizabeth Tsurkov, Workers Hotline: “Cancer in Our Body”—On 
Racial Incitement against Asylum Seekers from Africa, Discrimination and Hate Crimes 
against them (Jan.–June 2012), https://hotline.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/IncitementAndHateCrimesReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MQX-KH9Q]. 
 19  File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, 
para. 20 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 20  SECURING ISRAEL, supra note 12. 
 21 Not a single person was able to come in through the Egyptian border in 
2017, and only a handful came in since 2013.  2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at 3. 
 22 Prevention of Infiltration (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714–1954, 8 133, 
(1953–54) (Isr.).  The Israeli legislature amended the harsh provisions as a result of 
judicial review, as elaborated in this Article. 
 23 Id. These provisions are no longer valid. 
 24 In February 2008, the Minister of Interior decided to prohibit this 
population from working or staying in the geographical areas between Gadera and 
Hadera, covering the center of Israel.  This policy was inserted as a condition of the 
temporary permits of stay issued to these people, under § 2 of the Entry into Israel 
Law. See Entry into Israel Law, 5712–1952, § 2, 6 159, (1951–52) (Isr.).  A petition 
against this policy to the Supreme Court led the Minister of Interior to cancel this 
policy.  See File No. 5616/09 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), African Refugee 
Development Center v. Minister of Interior (Aug. 26, 2009), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 25 File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the Interior 
(Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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which included heavy taxation on their employers,26 salary 
reductions,27 and limitations on their ability to transfer remittances 
until they departed from Israel.28  It also limited their ability to access 
the Israeli welfare state by excluding them from the national health 
care scheme,29 denying their access to most social and economic 
rights (including the right to gainful employment,30 housing 
subsidies, most governmental and municipal welfare services, legal 
 
 26 File No. 4946/16 Court of Appeals, Saad v. Revenue Services, Ashkelon 
Branch (Sept. 12, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) 
(stating that employers who employ foreign workers in Israel, including people 
from Sudan and Eritrea, have to pay a special tax of 20% of the salary of the 
employee to the State.  This tax cannot be deducted from the employee’s salary, but 
it makes employing foreign workers less attractive and their salaries more costly to 
employers.  The Supreme Court denied a petition against the application of this tax 
to undocumented migrants.). 
 27 Under the amendment to the Foreign Workers Law, 5751–1991, which 
became effective on May 1, 2017, the State requires employers of people who 
entered Israel through a non-authorized border crossing to make monthly deposits 
to a designated account held by the State in favor of the employee.  The State will 
release these monies only when the person permanently leaves Israel and may 
forfeit the money if he does not leave Israel when required.  The employer will 
deposit 16% of the employee’s wages as severance and pension funds.  In addition, 
the employer will deduct 20% of the employee’s wages in favor of this deposit.  See 
Yoel Lipovetzky, Information Sheet—Infiltrator Foreign Worker Deposit, POPULATION 
AND IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY (May 14, 2017), 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/guide/guide_for_infilitrators_regarding_monie
s_from_employers/he/Information%20Sheet%20%E2%80%93%20Infiltrator%20F
oreign%20Worker%20Deposit.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D5N-TL8Q].  In practice, in 
most cases, employers pocketed the deductions instead of putting them in the 
deposit.  This practice was met by little enforcement.  See Lee Yaron, Israeli 
Employers Pocketing Deposits Deducted From Asylum Seekers’ Pay, HAARETZ (June 28, 
2019, 1:42 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-
employers-pocketing-deposits-deducted-from-asylum-seekers-pay-1.7418455 
[https://perma.cc/8TN6-UBRA]; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Under 
Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Trafficking in 
Persons Report 254 (June 20, 2019) (calling on Israel to “[r]epeal the ‘Deposit Law’ 
(article 4 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law), which significantly increases 
vulnerabilities to trafficking for the irregular African migrant population.”). 
 28 Prevention of Infiltration (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714–1954, §§ 7a, 
7b, 7c, 8 133, (1953–54) (as amended in 2018) (Isr.). 
 29 According to the Foreign Workers Order (Prohibition of Unlawful 
Employment and Assurance of Fair Conditions) (Health Services Package to 
Workers), 2001, the law requires employers to pay for private health insurance that 
covers specified services, regardless of the legal status of the foreign employee.  See 
Health Insurance for Foreign Workers, KOL ZCHUT, 
https://www.kolzchut.org.il/en/Health_Insurance_for_Foreign_Workers 
[https://perma.cc/G5EG-Y78F] (last updated Mar. 3, 2019). 
 30 But see discussion infra note 42. 
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services, etc.).31  The State further restricted their ability to operate 
independent businesses.32  Some Israeli officials used derogatory 
and delegitimizing terms when referring to this population.33  All of 
these measures have resulted in their social marginalization and 
extreme vulnerability.  These different measures were effective in 
prompting many of these people to leave the country and seek 
refuge and safety elsewhere.  Of the 65,000 undocumented entrants 
who entered Israel since 2007, only around 37,000 were still residing 
in Israel at the end of 2017.34 
These different exclusionary policies have sparked litigation.  
Petitions of individuals and human rights organizations challenged 
the fundamental aspects of the exclusionary regime applied by 
Israel, including: immigration detention35 and the conditions 
 
 31 Galia Sabar & Elizabeth Tsurkov, Israel’s Policies toward Asylum-Seekers: 
2002–2014, ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.osce.org/networks/newmedtrackII/165436?download=true 
[https://perma.cc/7AAU-ZS94]. 
 32 To get a permit to open a business, a person must be a resident of Israel.  
These new regulations emerged around 2010.  Eritreans and Sudanese have tried to 
bypass these regulations by using third parties as the “faces” of their businesses.  
See Tally Kritzman-Amir & Anda Barak-Bianco, Food as Means of Control: On Food 
and Asylum Law and Policy in Israel, in FOOD AND THE LAW 597, 614-615 (Yofi Tirosh 
& Aeyal Gross eds., 2017) (in Hebrew). 
 33 Tsurkov, supra note 18 at 10, 13 (noting that statements from Israeli 
politicians and decision-makers include claims that an “overwhelming majority of 
those claiming asylum in Israel are ‘illegal work infiltrators’ and not genuine 
refugees,” that “15% of the asylum-seekers ask for protection because spirits are 
haunting them,” that asylum-seekers are “a cancer in our body” and that asylum 
seekers are “‘infiltrators,’ ‘criminals,’ a ‘demographic threat’ and worse”). 
 34 2018 Data of PIA, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 35 The Court invalidated parts of the law three times. See HCJ 7146/12 Adam 
v. The Knesset 64(2) PD 717, 745 (2013) (Isr.); File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court 
of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli 
Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Eitan decision]; File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice 
(Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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thereof,36 expulsion,37 geographical restrictions,38 salary 
reductions,39 refusal to naturalize,40 the documents’ renewal 
services,41 and the poor access to social and economic rights.42 
In many of these cases, the Supreme Court struck down 
significant policy measures or parts thereof, thus introducing 
 
 36 The Court accepted the petition in part and ordered to prevent 
overcrowding in the mandatory residence center as well as enable residents to 
possess cleaning materials in File No. 4386/16 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem) 
Madio v. Commission of Prisons (June 13, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  The Court accepted the petition in part and allowed 
the residents to enter ready-made food to their rooms though denied their request 
to cook for themselves in File No. 4581/15 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Ismail 
v. Comptroller of Prisons (Nov. 19, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.). The State committed to improve residents’ access to computers in 
light of a pending petition in File No. 4389/16 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), 
Tespaisius v. Comptroller of Prisons (June 25, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 37 The Court upheld third countries’ agreements but ruled that a person’s 
dismay at removal cannot serve as a cause for his or her detention when the State 
declares that it does not remove against people’s will.  File No. 8101/15 
Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 38 The State abolished the policy in light of the petition.  For discussion, see 
supra note 24 and accompanying text.  See also File No. 5616/09 High Court of Justice 
(Jerusalem), African Refugee Development Center v. Minister of Interior (Aug. 26, 
2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 10463/08 
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), African Refugees Development Center v. 
Minister of Interior (Aug. 6, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 39 HCJ 2293/17 Zagai Gresgher v. The Knesset (pending) (Isr.). 
 40 The Jerusalem District Court sitting as an Administrative Appeals Court 
denied petitioners’ argument that a long stay in Israel as a refugee entitles a person 
to permanent residency status or even naturalization.  File No. 35344-03-10  
Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Galan v. Minister of Interior (Apr. 15, 2012), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  A petition against this 
decision is still pending in the Israeli Supreme Court.  See File No. 4288/12, 
Administrative Petition, John Doe v. Minister of Interior (pending) (Isr.). 
 41 The Court denied the petition, without discussing it on the merits, as the 
petitioners had an alternative remedy by petitioning the administrative courts.  File 
No. 7501/17 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Hotline for Refugees and Migrants 
v. Minister of Interior (May 9, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 42 On the consent granted by a municipality to enroll children of these 
populations in public schools in the shadow of a petition, see File No. 6162/12 
Administrative Appeals, Eilat Municipality v. Maged Mangan (Aug. 27, 2012) (Isr.).  
On the State’s commitment not to enforce the law forbidding employers to employ 
people who entered Israel through a non-recognized border and lack permit to 
work, see File No. 6312/10 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Kav LaOved  v. 
Government (Jan. 16, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3
2019] African Undocumented Entrants in Israel 55 
significant changes into Israel’s policies with regard to asylum 
seekers.  In some of the cases, the State conceded to grant these 
people various rights in the shadow of a pending petition.  In the 
immigration detention context, the tension between the branches of 
government has peaked since the Court struck down sections of the 
law authorizing immigration detention three times within a two-
year period, leading the legislature to redraft it each time anew.43  
Aware of the high-stakes of this heated dialogue between the 
branches of government, the Court used various strategies—
including the use of constitutional avoidance and comparative 
law—to mitigate the tension with the representative branches.44 
The Court had repeatedly exhibited judicial activism, despite the 
fact that immigration matters—which are infused with profound 
social, financial, and security-related issues—are traditionally 
viewed as matters within the sovereign realm of the executive and 
the legislature.45  By doing this, the Court attempted to fulfill its 
counter-majoritarian role, protecting the rights of the disempowered 
and politically under-represented (or, in this case, unrepresented) 
minority group of undocumented entrants.  Yet at the same time, the 
Court risked retaliation and curtailment of judicial power.  The 
government and some of the political parties which support it 
responded to some of these Court’s decisions in an extreme manner, 
threatening to curtail the Court’s power.  They initiated bills to 
amend the Basic Laws of the State of Israel, which the Court treats 
as Israel’s formal supreme constitution,46 but that enjoy light 
entrenchment so that the Knesset may amend them in most 
instances by a simple majority.47  Of particular importance in this 
context is coalition members’ bills that would have incorporated a 
general override clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 
to allow the Knesset to re-enact laws struck down by the Court to 
protect constitutional rights.48  The former Minister of Justice, Ayelet 
 
 43 See supra note 35. 
 44 See infra Parts 3 and 4. 
 45 See, e.g., HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior 61 P.D. 202 (2006) (Isr.). 
 46 See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Vill. 49(4) 
PD 221 (1995) (Isr.). 
 47 Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the 
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS 
CONST. L. Q. 457 (2012); Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for 
Judicial Review and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 349 (2012). 
 48 See Jonathan Lis & Revital Hovel, Right-Wing Ministers Unveil Bill to Let 
Knesset Override Supreme Court, HAARETZ (Dec. 20, 2017), 
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Shaked, made it a goal to “pack” the Court with conservative justices 
through judicial appointments (but with no attempt to increase the 
size of the Court).49  The legal drama, in addition to the human 
drama, weighed heavily on the Court as it dealt with these 
migration-related cases. 
This Article argues that the Israeli Supreme Court took a 
courageous judicial stance intended to protect the constitutional 
rights of the weakest members of Israeli society, determining that 
undocumented entrants’ rights are constitutionally protected, even 
at the price of taking heat from the representative branches.50  At the 
same time, many of its decisions were formalistic, even technical, 
and did not address in a substantial way some of the major 
constitutional or international law issues on the agenda.  Most 
importantly, by choosing the formalistic path, the Court failed to 
hold the representative branches accountable for their policy choices 
regarding undocumented entrants.  Thus, even after the Court’s 
decisions, these branches could argue that the population at hand is 
comprised of economic migrants.  The Court should have compelled 
the representative branches to conduct an effective and fair RSD 
process that would yield decisions within a reasonable time, 
whether the individuals are migrant workers or refugees.  The Court 
should have further treated the length of a person’s presence in the 
country as a consideration that may lead to the acquisition of rights.  
We suggest that these formalistic and reductionist approaches were 
a conscious strategic attempt on the part of the Court to downplay 
the significance of its decisions.  But the Court’s strategy of leaving 
ambiguity in its treatment of the substantive issues has backfired, 
and the costs of this decision outweigh the benefits.  The heavy 
prices of this approach are borne by the political branches (including 
the Court) and ultimately, by the Israeli society and, perhaps most 
of all, by the undocumented entrants, which the Court sought to 
protect.  This human and legal drama should be studied closely by 
any country that confronts similar dilemmas. 
 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-bill-would-let-knesset-
overridesupreme-court-1.5629190. 
 49 Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, Shaked: The Process of Changing the Supreme 
Court Has Ended, ISR. NAT’L NEWS (Feb. 23, 2018, 02:28 AM), 
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/242313 
[https://perma.cc/8MZD-PAQ7]. 
 50 Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (discussing the civil status of 
people as one of the considerations affecting the question whether they enjoy 
constitutional rights). 
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Our criticism of the Israeli approach is especially applicable to 
Trump’s recent asylum ban,51 which if upheld by the Court in Trump 
v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant,52 will lead to results similar to those 
already evident in Israel.  Trump’s asylum ban would mean that 
refugees otherwise entitled to full protection would enjoy mere 
protection against removal.  The implications for the asylum seekers 
and society at large of a policy that leaves people in a liminal state 
of mere protection from removal are manifest in the Israeli story and 
should serve as a warning to the U.S. 
Interestingly, it was the lower courts, particularly the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Israeli equivalent of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA),53 that occasionally stood up to the 
challenge and started to impose on the administrative branches the 
costs of failing to reach individual RSD decisions in a timely 
fashion.54  A similar judicial pattern, in which lower courts are on 
occasion more “courageous” than the Supreme Court in guarding 
asylum seekers’ rights, is manifested in the U.S. as well, and this 
Article reveals this dynamic when discussing the Jennings v. 
Rodriguez case. 55 
Part 2 of this Article argues that at times courts may 
courageously protect rights yet fail in their ultimate task of holding 
the political branches accountable.  In the Israeli context, although 
the Court invalidated immigration detention three times in two 
 
 51 Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57661 (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 52 So far, the Federal District Courts issued a temporary restraining order, 
followed by a preliminary injunction.  See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018) (order); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F.Supp.3d 
1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (order granting temporary injunction); Trump v. E. Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 782, 202 L.Ed.2d 510 (2018) (order in pending case), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/122118zr_986b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FG72-LJVB]. 
 53 Immigration Appeal Tribunal, KAN-TOR & ACCO, 
https://www.ktalegal.com/israel-immigration/immigration-appeal-tribunal 
[https://perma.cc/F628-H8FP].  In the Israeli immigration system, the Population 
and Immigration Authority clerks make the initial decisions.  Individuals may 
appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to review these decisions.  They may 
later further appeal to the District Court sitting as an Administrative Court and 
ultimately to the Supreme Court. Id.  In the U.S., individuals may appeal the 
decisions of asylum officers to the immigration judges, then to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, then to Circuit Courts, and finally to the Supreme Court.  See 
United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals 
[https://perma.cc/N8LC-Q9K2]. 
 54 See discussion infra Part 2. 
 55 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
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years, it did not use the force of constitutional law to require the 
representative branches to account for who the individual people 
are and what rights they acquired as a result of their lengthy 
presence in the country.  Parts 3 and 4 elaborate on the various 
strategies courts may employ to reduce the tension with the 
representative branches and their shortcomings.  Constitutional 
avoidance may be more interventionist than invalidation. 
Comparative law may be used without according enough weight to 
distinguishing factors.  These arguments are shown in the Israeli 
Court’s treatment of immigration detention as well as agreements to 
remove undocumented entrants to third countries.  Particularly, the 
Court relied heavily on U.S. case law when making some of its 
decisions, though it should have better accounted for the similarities 
and differences between the two legal regimes. 
2. AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ISSUES 
Perhaps the most evident example of the manner in which the 
Israeli Supreme Court was determined to protect the rights of this 
vulnerable population is a series of cases dealing with the 
constitutionality of the detention of undocumented entrants.  
Paradoxically, the Court invalidated immigration detention 
legislation three times without using any of these cases as an 
opportunity to hold the political branches accountable regarding the 
most basic question of whether these people should be treated as 
refugees. 
2.1. Engaging in a Three-Stage Judicial Review of Immigration 
Detention 
When the first Sudanese immigrants entered Israel 
clandestinely, through the Egyptian border, Israel’s Ministry of 
Justice responded by invoking an old law, titled the Prevention of 
Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (The Infiltration Law).56  
The Knesset enacted the Prevention of Infiltration Law in 1954 to 
allow for the criminalization, detention, and removal of 
 
 56 Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction), 5714-1954, SH 
No. 16 p. 160 (as amended in 2012) (Isr.). 
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undocumented entrants into Israel.57  At the time, the State enacted 
the statute as a state of emergency law and justified it with the need 
to prevent the entry of terrorists into the country.58  The security and 
military apparatuses authorized and executed these detentions and 
removals.  The law provided for administrative tribunals, consisting 
of military personnel, who tried the cases as courts of first instance 
and appellate courts.  The decisions of these tribunals were final 
with no right of appeal to civil courts.59  The law targeted citizens, 
residents, or visitors from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen.60  Israel considered all of these countries 
“enemy states” at the time of the bill’s passage. 
In January 2006, Israel began to apply the law to Sudanese 
immigrants, some of whom were victims of the harsh events, often 
classified as genocide, perpetrated in Darfur, as well as entrants 
from others areas of North and South Sudan.61  The executive branch 
justified its application of the law to this population on the basis of 
general security considerations because of the poor relations (or lack 
thereof) between Israel and Sudan.62  Israel applied a parallel law, 
the Entry into Israel Law of 1952, to other undocumented entrants 
from non-enemy countries, authorizing shorter immigration 
detention periods of typically up to sixty days, subject to judicial 
review, in civil detention facilities rather than in military facilities. 63  
Individual detainees challenged the use of the Infiltration Law 
against Sudanese immigrants in the Supreme Court (sitting as a 
High Court of Justice) in 2006.64  In July 2008, the State committed in 
Court to transferring undocumented entrants caught by the security 
forces to civil detention facilities ran by the immigration authority 
 
 57 Id. §§ 2–30. 
 58 Id. §34. 
 59 Id. §§ 11–23; see also Yonatan Berman, Detention of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Israel, in WHERE LEVINSKI MEETS ASMARA: ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 
IN ISRAEL- SOCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 147, 188 (Tally Kritzman-Amir ed., 2015) (in 
Hebrew). 
 60 Id. §1 amended in 2012; see also HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset 64(2) PD  
717, ¶ 11 (2013) (Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.). 
 61 See Petition for Israeli Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting HCJ 
3208/06 Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.), 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/uploadfiles/darpurs_refugees.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4G6-KFLD] (Isr.); see also Berman, supra note 59, at 187. 
 62 Kritzman-Amir & Ramji-Nogales, supra note 13. 
 63 Entry into Israel Law 6712-1952, SH No. 354 (Isr.). 
 64 HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties v. The Head of the Operations Division 
in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
60 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:1 
within two to three days.  Within fourteen days of a person’s 
detention in such facilities, the State will bring the detainee before 
an adjudicator to review the detention under the Entry into Israel 
Law.  Only if the security forces found that there are unique 
individual circumstances that justify it, may the State deviate from 
this legal arrangement.  This decision practically meant that the State 
committed to refrain from using the Infiltration Law against 
Sudanese immigrants, who enter through the Egyptian border.  The 
State accepted the position of the petitioners, the district courts, and 
even army personnel, that it may not apply a presumption of 
dangerousness against these people.  This commitment forms part 
of the Court’s decision in 2008.65 
But five years later, in 2012, the Israeli legislature introduced an 
amendment to the Infiltration Law, authorizing the three-year 
detention of undocumented entrants, and the possibly indefinite 
detention of enemy nationals, including the Sudanese.66  The High 
Court of Justice struck down this amendment, as well as two 
subsequent amendments to the Infiltration Law or provisions 
thereof, forcing the legislature to redraft them multiple times.67 
In the Adam decision of September 2013, the Court ruled that a 
three-year immigration detention period amounted to a criminal 
penalty, and an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutional 
right to liberty of these undocumented entrants, and struck down a 
section of the statute.68 
The legislature quickly responded by amending the statute in a 
speedy legislative process, creating a two-track system: the 
undocumented entrants would be in detention for a year, and the 
State may further place them in a designated residency center 
 
 65 See Berman, supra note 59, at 189; see also HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties 
v. The Head of the Operations Division in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008) 
(Isr.) (updating announcement of the respondents to the Court, July 10, 2007). 
 66 Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Amendment no. 
3 and Temporary Provisions), 5772-2012, SH No. 2332 p. 119, §§30A (C)(3), 30A 
(D)(3) (Isr.). 
 67 Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Amendment no. 
3 and Temporary Provisions), 5772-2012, SH No. 2332 p. 119 (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Amendment 3]; Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) 
(Amendment no. 4 and Temporary Provisions), 5774-2013, SH No. 2419 p. 74 (Isr.) 
[hereinafter Amendment 4]; Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and 
Jurisdiction) (Amendments and Temporary Provisions), 5775-2014, 5775-2014, SH 
No. 2483 p. 84 (Isr.) [hereinafter Amendment 5]. Prevention of Infiltration Law 
(Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Temporary Provisions), 5778-2017, SH No. 2673 p. 60 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Amendment 6]. 
 68 HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset 64(2) PD  717, 745 (2013) (Isr.). 
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indefinitely.  The statute itself was enacted as a temporary measure 
valid for three years.69  Simultaneously, the State opened a residency 
center right next to the detention facility, in the far south of Israel, 
remote from any settlement.  The statute imposed severe restrictions 
on the freedom of movement of the “residents,” who had to report 
three times throughout the day (morning, noon, and evening) to the 
detention officers within the facility.70  These requirements 
effectively prevented them from leaving the facility.  The prison 
authority ran the residency center and subjected the “residents” to 
administrative sanctions if they disobeyed the rules, which included 
transfer to the immigration detention facility. 
In September 2014, the Court decided in the Eitan case—a second 
petition against the constitutionality of the Infiltration Law—to 
strike down this new version of the statute.71  The Court held that 
the year-long detention period was an unconstitutional 
infringement of the undocumented entrants’ right to liberty.72  It 
further found the nature of the “residency center” problematic since 
the various restrictions imposed on the undocumented entrants 
made it almost indistinguishable from a detention facility.73 
The legislature amended the statute for the second time by 
liberalizing the detention scheme.74  It shortened the maximum 
immigration detention period from a year to three months.75  It cut 
down the stay period in the residency center to twenty months and 
granted the residents some more freedom of movement, having 
them report to the facility authorities only once a day, at night.76 
But petitioners brought a third petition before the Court, 
challenging the constitutionality of the newly amended law.  In the 
Desta case,77 the Court ruled that one must read into the immigration 
detention scheme an implied condition that the State cannot detain 
 
 69 Amendment 4, supra note 67, §30A, ch. 4. 
 70 Amendment 4, supra note 67.  Regulations to Prevent Infiltration (Offenses 
and Jurisdiction) (Presence of Resident within the Center and Exit from the Center) 
(Provisional Provisions), 2013, KT 308. 
 71 File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli 
Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Amendment 5, supra note 67. 
 75 Amendment 5, supra note 67. 
 76 Amendment 5, supra note 67. 
 77 File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset 
(Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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undocumented entrants even for three months, unless the detention 
serves the purpose of their identification and removal (whether 
voluntary or forced).  This implies that since Israel was not refouling 
people to Sudan and Eritrea due to their unstable political climate, 
it could not hold Sudanese and Eritrean immigrants in detention for 
the entire three-month period, but rather had to release them upon 
their identification.78  The Court further ruled that a mandatory 
twenty-month long residence in a residency center is 
unconstitutional since it constitutes too great an infringement of the 
right to liberty.79  Accordingly, the Court invalidated the lengthy 
mandatory residency period but suspended the remedy for six 
months.80  During this period of six months, the State would not be 
permitted to hold persons for longer than twelve months in the 
residency center.  The Court further ordered that the State should 
immediately release those held for longer at the time of decision.81  
Following this decision, the Knesset introduced a new amendment, 
shortening the duration of the stay in the residency center to a 
maximum of twelve months.82  A subsequent amendment closed 
down the residency center as of March 15, 2018, since the 
government believed that it did not serve its purpose any more.83 
In this series of judicial decisions, the Court displayed judicial 
activism in striking down three versions of the same law in two 
years.  It led the legislature to cut down the immigration detention 
period from three years to three months, coupled by a year-long stay 
in a residency center.  This repeated confrontation between the 
branches of government thus led, at least in principle, to significant 
 
 78 Id. ¶ 5, 41 (Naor, Pres., opinion). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. ¶ 115. 
 82 Amendment 6, supra note 67. 
 83 The government closed the center thinking it was no longer needed in light 
of its intention to transfer the undocumented migrants, in accordance with bilateral 
agreements reached with third countries, which the Court had upheld. Prevention 
of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction) (Temporary Provisions), 5778–2017, 
HH No. 1167 p. 84, at 85 (Isr.).  In media interviews and tweets, officials further 
justified the decision to close down the Holot residency center by explaining that it 
no longer deters undocumented migrants from staying in Israel, in light of Court 
decisions that have improved the living conditions and freedom of movement of 
those held there.  They also argued that running the facility was very expensive and 
some of the funds could be used to hire more inspectors and remove more people.  
See Sue Surkes & AFP, Ministers vote to close Holot migrant detention center, THE TIMES 
OF ISRAEL (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/ministers-vote-to-close-
holot-migrant-detention-center/ [https://perma.cc/6GF5-9SQ5]. 
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improvements in the protection of the constitutional right to liberty 
of undocumented entrants. 
2.2. Failing to Determine Who These Migrants Are 
2.2.1. The Failure to Require Accountability 
Nevertheless, remarkably, the Court introduced this dramatic 
change in the immigration detention regime without requiring the 
authorities to determine whether the detained persons were 
refugees or economic migrants.  While the legal categorization of 
undocumented entrants is sometimes challenging,84 it is obviously 
critical, as there are clear legal obligations which derive from 
characterizing people as refugees. 
The Court was unable to rely on either the State or the petitioners 
for the legal categorization of these undocumented entrants.  This is 
because the State prevented their access to the RSD process until 
2013,85 and granted them instead, a group-based protection from 
refoulement, with very limited access to social and economic rights, 
as detailed above.86  The state’s terminology and reasons for 
extending only group-based rather than individual-based 
protection changed over time, but it was nevertheless clear that 
these are persons who cannot be returned to their countries of 
origin.87  The Court criticized the State’s heavy reliance on 
prolonged group-based protection without determining the 
duration of such protection,88 without grounding this form of 
protection in procedures or regulations, and without anchoring the 
 
 84 See TALLY KRITZMAN-AMIR, SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFUGEES (2009) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author) (regarding the blurry lines 
between the category of “refugee” and that of “economic migrant”). 
 85 File No. 3844-17 Court of Appeals, John Doe & Others v. Ministry of 
Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Dec. 13, 2017), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 86 See supra Part I. 
 87 HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  717, para. 112 (2013), (Arbel, 
J., opinion) (Isr.). 
 88 AdminA 8908/11 Nesenet Argey Asefu v. The Ministry of Interior, para. 16 
(2011) (Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.); HCJ, 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  
717, para. 9 (2013) (Arbel, J., opinion) (Isr.). 
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rights of the protected persons.89  At the same time, the Court 
refrained from prohibiting the State to use this form of protection.  
The reliance on group-based temporary protection was not unique 
to Israel: other countries have relied on temporary protection in 
cases of large-scale undocumented entry, though Israel applied the 
protection without enabling access to individual RSD for many 
years.90 
Group-based temporary protection has the advantage of 
granting immediate relief without the need for a case-by-case 
determination of refugee status, which is costly and 
administratively burdensome for states.  It is a regime of fewer 
rights to more people: it can also cover populations which without 
it would not be entitled to protection, but in the absence of a binding 
international instrument codifying this regime, temporary 
protection grants those protected fewer rights.  It is intended, 
however, to be a temporary regime. States cannot substitute their 
obligations under the Refugee Convention with group-based 
temporary protection.91  Additionally, whereas states must meet 
clear standards for the termination of the protection of refugees,92 
there are no such standards for the termination of temporary 
protection.93 
Granting temporary protection also allows states to postpone 
dealing with individual persons, since they are handled as members 
of their group of nationality, or as demographics.  Individuals do 
 
 89 See id. (Hayut J., opinion); HCJ, 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  
717, para. 9 (2013) (Arbel, J., opinion) (Isr.). 
 90 See Randall Hansen, et al., Report on the Workshop on Refugee and Asylum 
Policy in Practice in Europe and North America, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 801, 809 (2000) 
(“The issue of how long protection should remain temporary if conflict continues 
received considerable attention. Current policies vary considerably, from three 
years in Holland to seven years in the United Kingdom.”). 
 91 Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized 
Regime, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 279 (2000); Joseph Pugliese, The Incommensurability of Law 
to Justice: Refugees and Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa, 16 L. & LITERATURE 285, 
296–98 (2004); Scott Reynolds, European Council Directive 2001/55/EC: Toward a 
Common European Asylum System, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 359 (2002). 
 92 Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(C).  Under the section, the 
protection of the Convention shall cease to apply to a refugee if, inter alia, “[h]e can 
no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been 
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of 
the protection of the country of his nationality; Provided that this paragraph shall 
not apply to a refugee falling under section A(1) of this article who is able to invoke 
compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself 
of the protection of the country of nationality”.  Id. art. 1(C)(5). 
 93 Joan Fitzpatrick, supra note 91, at 284. 
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not need—nor get the opportunity—to tell their stories and establish 
a well-founded fear of persecution.  Instead, it is sufficient that they 
prove their nationality.  Their voice is unheard, their humanity 
unexposed, and they do not seem relatable.  They are not perceived 
in their entirety, but rather their existence is narrowed down to their 
“otherness.”94 
In lieu of requiring the State to make a determination on the 
international status of the individuals, the Israeli Supreme Court 
referred to the individuals subject to this immigration detention 
regime as “infiltrators”.95  While the use of this term is technically 
justifiable, as this is the term used in the legislation itself,96 it is also 
a derogatory term.  The term implies bad faith on the part of the 
undocumented entrant, as well as possibly a harmful intent.  
“Infiltrators” is a term that directs the focus on the undocumented 
entry, while “refugees” is a term that focuses on the reasons which 
are behind the decision to leave the country of citizenship or 
residency.  “Infiltrators” is also a term that maintains the framing of 
these individuals as the impersonal “others.”  These implied 
meanings did not escape the Court, and though some of the Justices 
hesitated using this term, they nevertheless chose to continue using 
it as the appropriate legalistic term under Israeli law.97  Further, the 
Court used this term, while admitting it is difficult to establish the 
correct categorization of these individuals.98 
It is difficult to understand how the Court could have made 
decisions on the matter of immigration detention without 
distinguishing between different types of undocumented entrants 
and without requiring the State to reach a decision within a 
reasonable and predefined period of time in pending applications 
for refugee protection.  The categorization has an impact on the 
 
 94 Tally Kritzman-Amir, “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in Israel’s 
Asylum Regime, 42 ISR. L. REV. 603, 619 (2009). 
 95 HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  717, 745 (2013); File No. 
7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Eitan—Israeli Immigration 
Policy Center v. The Israeli Government (Sept. 22, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), 
Desta v. The Knesset para. 4 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 96 Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Jurisdiction), supra note 22. 
 97 HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  717, paras. 10–12 (2013), 
(Vogelman, J., concurring opinion) (Isr.). 
 98 File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice, Desta v. The Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015) 
(Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); HCJ 
7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  717, paras. 7–8 (2013) (Vogelman, J., 
opinion) (Isr.). 
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rights of the undocumented entrants under both international and 
constitutional law.  Arguably, the constitutionality of the length of 
detention may differ when the detained are refugees or economic 
migrants. 
The proper categorization of the undocumented entrants was an 
issue that explicitly came up before the Court.  The parties to the 
different petitions raised the dispute as to the characterization of 
these individuals and thus this was an issue that the Court could 
have tackled.99  The Court should have created a rebuttable 
presumption of refugee status in favor of these people, if the State 
did not make a determination within the defined period.  Such a 
ruling could have incentivized the government to conduct efficient 
RSD processes.  This position would have also been supported by 
international refugee law, which views recognizing the refugee 
status of a person as merely declaratory and allows states to refrain 
from processing migrants through individualized RSDs, so long as 
they grant them the same rights-protections as granted to 
refugees.100  Such a ruling would have also been in line with the 
Israeli immigration detention norms, which instructed the State to 
release from immigration detention asylum seekers who submitted 
asylum application, if those applications were not examined within 
three months, or whose RSD was not completed within nine 
months.101 
Since the Court refrained from requiring the State to determine 
whether these migrants are refugees or economic migrants, it did 
not confront the complexities of the Israeli RSD process.  As 
mentioned above, PIA admitted in the Israeli legislature that it 
granted less than 0.1% of asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea 
refugee status.102   Such markedly low recognition rates differ 
 
 99 See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  However, the petitioners’ position was that even if 
the detained are not refugees, they should not be detained since they are not 
deportable.  Petition in HCJ 8665/14 Desta v. The Knesset, paras. 158–59 (Dec. 18, 
2014) (Isr.), https://law.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit8665.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GKM9-DFXB)]. 
 100 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
154–92 (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
 101 See HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset, 64(2) P.D.  717, para. 37 (2013) 
(Vogelman, J., opinion) (Isr.). 
 102 See supra Part I. 
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significantly from those of other democracies.103  UNHCR, as well as 
Israel’s own State Comptroller, have criticized the Israeli treatment 
of Eritreans and Sudanese, calling its RSD processes unfair and 
ineffective.104  The Israeli Supreme Court criticized this exclusionary 
asylum regime on a handful of occasions,105 but it never went ahead 
and required the State to conduct a fair RSD process, even when this 
remedy was specifically requested.106  Nor did the Court apply a 
 
 103 In comparison, in EU member states, in the third quarter of 2017, 
recognition rates of Eritrean and Sudanese as refugees were 54.45% (3,330 out of 
6,060) and 50.2% (1,200 out of 2,390) respectively.  See First instance decisions by 
outcome and recognition rates, 30 main citizenships of asylum applicants granted decisions 
in the EU-28, 3rd quarter 2017, EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED (Dec. 13, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:First_instance_decisions_by_outcome_and_recognition
_rates,_30_main_citizenships_of_asylum_applicants_granted_decisions_in_the_E
U-28,_3rd_quarter_2017.png [https://perma.cc/9GMJ-KSCN].  A higher 
percentage of the Eritreans and Sudanese enjoys other protections.  The 
undocumented migrants entering Israel may very well have been different from 
those reaching Europe even when they came from the same countries.  To enter into 
Israel, one had to walk, rather than cross oceans. But even that cannot explain the 
sharp different recognition rates of Israel and Europe. 
 104 UNHCR’s position on the status of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals defined as 
‘infiltrators’ by Israel, UNHCR 1–2 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a5889584.html [https://perma.cc/34R6-
CB3Z]; State Comptroller’s Annual Report, supra note 10, at 1419–64. 
 105 See, e.g., File No. 7385/13, 8425/13 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), 
Eitan—Israeli Immigration Policy Center v. The Israeli Government, para. 35 (Sept. 
22, 2014) (Vogelman, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.) (“A comparative view shows that the world-wide percentage of 
approval for asylum requests submitted by Eritrean and Sudanese nationals – the 
countries of origin of the majority of the infiltrators in Israel—are significantly 
greater than the percentage in Israel.  In 2012 (the last year with updated figures), 
the worldwide percentage for the recognition of Eritreans as refugees was 81.9%, 
and 68.2% for Sudanese (see the current Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 102, 104).  According to the figures provided 
by the State, which are current as of March 3, 2014, it appears that less than 1% of 
asylum requests submitted in Israel by Eritrean nationals were approved, and not 
even one requests from Sudanese nationals was approved [ . . . ]”); File No. 8665/14 
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para. 3 (Aug. 11, 2015) 
(Hayut, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) 
(“Thus, from July 2009 until Feb. 5, 2015, a total of nine asylum requests submitted 
by Sudanese and Eritrean nationals were approved, and 1,037 requests were 
denied.  This data puts the rate of approval for asylum requests submitted in that 
period by Sudanese and Eritrean nationals in Israel at about 0.9%.  When this figure 
is compared to the percentage of asylum requests of these nationals worldwide, the 
comparison itself raises questions as to the manner in which the state examines and 
decides upon such requests, as what comes out is a product of what goes in”). 
 106 In petitions attacking the fact that the State dragged its feet and refrained 
from deciding cases of Sudanese asylum seekers from areas of ongoing conflict, the 
Court agreed to continuous extensions to allow the State excessive time for the 
completion of refugee status determination.  See File No. 4630/17 High Court of 
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presumption that they are refugees, given the State’s failure to 
determine their status.  For the State, it was probably preferable to 
be seen as slow to determine individual cases, rather than be 
perceived as rejecting Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers at a 
disproportionately higher rate than do other countries.107  The Court 
let the representative branches get away with this ambiguity. 
2.2.2. The Accountability Role of Courts 
It is a primary task of courts to bring the political branches to 
account for their actions.  Even without the power to invalidate 
statutes, courts have an array of powers that allow them to expose 
the true nature of political action as well as make the issue before 
them salient.  The courts may contribute to a culture that demands 
honesty, deliberation, and accountability, helping to create a more 
informed and conscious decision-making process for society at 
large.  By exposing the true nature of political action, the courts 
enable democratic processes to kick in and civil society to exert 
pressure on decision-makers, potentially deterring action that, if not 
for the exposure, would have been pursued. 
The role of the courts in holding other branches accountable is 
manifest in various common law doctrines.  One example is the 
maxim that the legislature must explicitly empower the 
administrative branch to infringe rights, otherwise the courts would 
interpret the grant of authority as not including such power.108  The 
requirement of explicitness is a form of accountability.  The 
constitutional avoidance doctrine, which enables courts to prefer a 
statutory interpretation that aligns with the constitution rather than 
 
Justice (Jerusalem), Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister (Oct. 29, 2018) (in 
Hebrew) (Isr.); see also HCJ 4630/17 Adam Gubara Tagal v. The Prime Minister 
(Dec. 17, 2018) (Isr.) (updating Response on Behalf of the Respondents). 
 107 As discussed in the text accompanying notes 8 & 9, the State’s legal position 
on the forced army draft prevented most Eritreans from receiving protection.  This 
legal position was overturned by the lower tribunal in the Mesegene Case.  See File 
No. 1010-14 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of Interior (Feb. 15, 
2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  The State has 
appealed this decision, but withdrew the appeal before the District Court reached 
a decision. See File No. 12154-04/18 Administrative Appeals, The State of Israel—
The Population and Immigration Authority v. Joe Doe (Feb. 15, 2018) (in Hebrew) 
(Isr.). 
 108 See Rivka Weill, Juxtaposing Constitution-Making and Constitutional-
Infringement Mechanisms in Israel and Canada: On the Interplay between Common Law 
Override and Sunset Override, 49 ISR. L. REV. 103, 108 (2016). 
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one that would lead to the incompatibility and invalidity of a statute, 
may be interpreted in a similar vein.109  If the political branches 
disagree with the statutory interpretation adopted under the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine, they may make their will to 
infringe rights more explicit.  The non-delegation doctrine enables 
the invalidation of administrative action, because the issue should 
be dealt with by the legislature, not the executive.110  It, too, is an 
accountability mechanism that prevents the legislature from 
escaping responsibility by delegation to the regulatory bodies. 
The beauty of this arsenal of tools is that the courts are within 
their traditional roles as interpreters or supervisors of the 
administrative branch, which is compatible even with a 
parliamentary sovereignty system.  Yet, they may powerfully 
change the incentives of the political actors.  Once the political actors 
understand that they will pay a significant political price for their 
actions, they may change course.  Justice Louise Brandeis rightly 
said: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.”111 
Even the explicit legislative override mechanism found in 
Canada and Israel owes its birth to this accountability idea.112  The 
legislature may infringe constitutional rights, but must override 
them explicitly in a statute, thus, giving full accountability for its 
actions.  The same applies for the British and New Zealand non-
compatibility frameworks, which enable courts to declare a statute 
incompatible with certain rights without striking the statute 
down.113  This time the courts are the ones to extract a political price 
from the legislature through publicity. 
While the Israeli Supreme Court courageously invalidated three 
statutes or provisions thereof in a two-year period to protect the 
right to liberty of undocumented entrants, it failed to use these 
 
 109 See infra Part 3.1. 
 110 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
 111 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(2009). 
 112 See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §33 (U.K.); 
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5752, SH No. 1454 p. 90, § 4 (Isr.). 
 113 See, e.g., Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK); Taylor v. Attorney General 
[2018] NZSC 104 (N.Z.); Rivka Weill, Exploring constitutional statutes in common law 
systems, in QUASI-CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES: FORMS, 
FUNCTIONS, APPLICATIONS 64 (Richard Albert & Joel I. Colón-Ríos eds., Routledge 
2019) [hereinafter Weill, Constitutional Statutes]. 
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opportunities to hold the representative branches accountable on 
the most fundamental question of all: deciding the identity of the 
individuals composing the group and the corresponding obligations 
of the State deriving from it.  Despite criticizing the State’s heavy 
reliance on a prolonged group-based protection, the Court refrained 
from forcing the State to make individual determinations on the 
status of these people nor grant them broader comparable rights to 
refugees. 
2.2.3. The Constitutional and International Law Implications 
It could be argued that the Court impliedly applied norms of 
refugee law to this population without determining explicitly that 
they are either refugees or presumptively refugees (until proven 
otherwise) for the sake of immigration detention.  For example, the 
Court referred to Article 31 of the Refugee Convention,114 which 
instructs: 
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account 
of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly 
from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the 
sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to 
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence. 
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of 
such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and 
such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the 
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another 
country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a 
reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission 
into another country.115 
This section conveys an understanding of the international 
community that refugees are often not in a position to obtain travel 
documents and entry permits to the countries to which they flee, and 
prohibits penalizing them for their undocumented entry or 
presence. 
 
 114 See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset, paras. 44, 68 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 115 Refugee Convention, supra note 8. 
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The Queen’s Bench Division in the U.K. interpreted the article to 
apply to asylum seekers, prior to their being recognized as refugees.  
It thus held that asylum seekers should not be prosecuted for 
possessing false documents on arrival in the U.K.116  It held that 
entry could only be gained in many cases by the use of false 
documents.117  This result aligns with a perception of refugee status 
as merely declarative, rather than constitutive. 118 
Allegedly, “[t]he expression “coming directly” in Article 31(1), 
covers the situation of a person who enters the country in which 
asylum is sought directly from the country of origin, or from another 
country where his protection, safety and security could not be 
assured. It is understood that this term also covers a person who 
transits an intermediate country for a short period of time without 
having applied for, or received, asylum there.”119  In the Israeli 
context, it would also apply to persons who have entered Israel after 
crossing through Egypt, but could not receive protection there. The 
Court refers to this section in the Refugee Convention, but refrains 
from explaining why it applies to the migrants at hand.120  At the 
same time, the Court interprets the section as allowing detention 
 
 116 See Regina v Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court and another, Ex p Adimi  Regina 
v Crown Prosecution Service, Ex p Sorani Regina v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex p Sorani Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
another, ex p Kaziu [2001] Q.B. 667, 674 , https://www-iclr-co-
uk.proxy.library.upenn.edu/document/2001002662/casereport_65817/html?quer
y=2001+Q.B.+667+&filter=&fullSearchFields=&page=1&sort=relevance&pageSize
=10# [https://perma.cc/UUV4-38Q8]. 
 117 Id. 
 118 According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR): “A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition.  This would 
necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally 
determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a 
refugee but declares him to be one.  He does not become a refugee because of 
recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.”   UNHCR, Handbook and 
Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 28 U.N. Doc. 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html%20%5baccessed%2023%20July
%202018 [https://perma.cc/S2SW-F676]. 
 119 UNHCR, UNHCR’s Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to 
the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, para. 4 (Feb. 1999), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3c2b3f844.html [https://perma.cc/XN7Q-
Q4WF]. 
 120 See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset, paras. 44, 68 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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and the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
asylum seekers before the determination of their status,121 rather 
than as it was meant to be applied, as prohibiting such restrictions 
as a general rule.122  Israel is not the only country to offer this 
restrictive interpretation of the section.  Other countries detain or 
restrict freedom of movement of asylum seekers prior to 
determining their status.123 
Moreover, even if the Court (mistakenly) interpreted the 
Refugee Convention to allow detention, it should have mattered 
whether the individuals are economic migrants or refugees.  The 
purpose of detention of each of these two types of migrants differs 
and affects the proportionality of the length of their detention. While 
migrant workers may be detained to enable their removal to their 
home countries, refugees cannot be refouled to a country where 
their life or liberty may be threatened on account of “race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”124  Their detention is not allowed under international law, 
by and large, save for reasons of identity verification or due to 
security and public order considerations.125 
Interestingly, the judicial restraint of the Supreme Court 
sometimes signifies the exact opposite of some of the decisions of 
the lower courts.  The lower Appeals Tribunals expressed on 
occasion harsher critique of the representative branches, pointing to 
unreasonable delays in the processing of individual asylum 
applications, or the barriers to applying for asylum.  They granted 
to some of these applicants permits to reside in Israel, until the 
Minister of Interior decides on their RSD applications.126  The 
 
 121 Id. at para. 44 (“Although these sections treat restrictions upon freedom of 
movement, according to the accepted interpretation they also apply to the detention 
of persons who unlawfully entered the state in order to file an asylum application”). 
 122 See UNHCR Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards, supra note 
119, para. 3 (stating that restrictions should not be automatic, unduly prolonged or 
without necessity). 
 123 See infra Part 4 (regarding the U.S.); see also Pugliese, supra note 91 
(regarding Australia); infra Part 4 (regarding residency centers). 
 124 Refugee Convention, supra note 8, article 33. 
 125 See Refugee Convention, supra note articles 9, 26, 31; see also 
UNHCR, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of 
Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, 24 (2012), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html [https://perma.cc/J4PD-
YJK7]. 
 126 See, e.g., File No. 4447-17 Appeals Tribunal, John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Feb. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File 3844-17 Appeals Tribunal, John 
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Appeals Tribunals also criticized the State’s sweeping legal position 
that rejected the vast majority of applications of Eritrean asylum 
seekers.  The State determined that fleeing a country to evade army 
service, does not fulfill the requirements of the Refugee Convention.  
Rejecting the State’s position, the Appeals Tribunals held that 
fleeing the army may at times be an act that leads the Eritrean 
authorities to attribute to the evaders political opinions that oppose 
the regime.  They may thus persecute those people on political 
grounds, if the State returned them to Eritrea. While institutionally 
lower courts might be more inclined to demonstrate judicial 
restraint, and are more institutionally dependent, they have, on 
occasion, shown a considerable degree of activism in these cases.  
They occasionally held the State accountable for its failure to 
conduct effective RSD processes in individual cases and even 
granted refugee status to an Eritrean.127  But unlike Supreme Court 
decisions, these lower court decisions do not have precedential 
value—they can be overturned128 —and they do not have the teeth 
of a constitutional case.129 
The U.S. judicial system is facing similar challenges in the 
context of the recent asylum ban.  The ban would effectively prevent 
the courts from adjudicating asylum requests of those entering the 
U.S. in an undocumented manner, i.e., not through designated ports 
of entry, and enable the entrants to enjoy protection against removal 
at most.130  While the legal challenges against the American asylum 
ban focus on its compliance with statutory law,131 this Article 
suggests that the ban may infringe international refugee norms as 
well, along the lines of some of the secondary arguments made in 
these legal challenges.  Upholding such a regime will prevent the 
 
Doe & Others v Ministry of Interior—Population and Immigration Authority (Dec. 
13, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 127 See, e.g., File No. 1010-14 Appeals Tribunal, John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior–The Population and Immigration Authority (Feb. 15, 2018), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (providing an example of a state being 
held accountable for its failure to conduct effective RSD processes). 
 128 See, e.g., CA 32641-10/18 The State of Israel—The Population and 
Immigration Authority v. Joe Doe (2017) (Isr.) (returning the decision in the 
Mesegene case to the lower court). 
 129 Compare with the analysis of the Courts’ rulings on migrant workers’ 
rights issues.  See Ofer Sitbon, The Place of the Courts in Israel and France in the 
Formation of the Policy on Migrant Workers, 10 L. & GOV. 273, 290–314 (2007) (in 
Hebrew). 
 130 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 131 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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courts from fulfilling their role to bring the representative branches 
to accountability. 
2.3. Failing to Refer to the Legal Implications of the Duration of 
Presence 
2.3.1. The Constitutional Law Dimension 
In various cases dealing with the constitutional rights of 
undocumented entrants, the Court had consistently refrained from 
making the length of their presence in the country into a 
constitutional consideration with implications on the scope of the 
rights they may be entitled to. This is despite the fact that the longer 
a person is positioned in a “temporary” state of uncertainty, the 
more it negatively affects his or her human dignity.132 
The majority of decisions in the detention cases, for example, did 
not refer to legal, social or moral consequences, which derive from 
the fact that while some of these undocumented entrants have been 
in Israel for a short period of time, others were present for over a 
decade. Members of the Court were aware of this distinction 
between old and new entrants. Justices Amit and Vogelman in 
separate concurring opinions suggested that, from a constitutional 
perspective, it might be less legitimate to transfer long-term 
undocumented entrants to residency centers, because of the greater 
disruption to their lives, as compared to new arrivals.133 
The cases on immigration detention are not the only cases in 
which the majority of the Court refused to derive constitutional 
consequences from the duration of a person’s presence in the 
 
 132 See, e.g., Pugliese, supra note 91 (examining the negative effects of 
Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa regime on the lives of refugees and asylum 
seekers); but see Joseph Melnick & Susan Roos, The Myth of Closure, 11 GESTALT 
REV. 90–107 (2007) (challenging the notion that a lack of emotional closure forms 
the basis of neurosis associated with grief and loss). 
 133 See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset, para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); id. at para. 52 (Vogelman, J., opinion).  Both Justice 
Amit and Justice Vogelman dissented on a different matter.  They held that the 
section of the law that allows the authorities to transfer detainees in residency 
centers to full detention in regular detention facilities as a disciplinary sanction is 
unconstitutional as it arises to the level of a criminal sanction in light of the lengthy 
detention period authorized under it. 
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country.  In a later case regarding the possible detention and 
supposedly “voluntary” removal of asylum seekers to third 
countries, the Court mentioned the duration of a person’s presence 
in Israel under a form of temporary protection, as a personal 
consideration, that the State should weigh when considering 
removal.134  However, this was not presented as a constitutional 
issue, but rather as a humanitarian consideration.  In a case 
challenging the lack of possibility to naturalize for refugees, the 
Court determined that the fact that a person has stayed in Israel 
eleven years, out of which he was a recognized refugee for seven 
years, does not create a legal obligation on the part of the State to 
grant him or her permanent, as opposed to temporary, residency.135  
Finally, when considering the policy of not granting asylum seekers 
a right to work, the Court determined that the commitment of the 
State to refrain from enforcing the prohibition on their employment 
“strikes a proper balance in the difficult and sensitive reality.”136  It 
did not, yet again, treat the duration of presence as a constitutional 
consideration, impacting the right to gainful employment.137 
 
 134 See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals, Zegete v. Minister of the 
Interior (Aug. 28, 2017) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 135 See File No. 35344-03-10, Administrative Affairs (Jerusalem), Galan v. 
Minister of Interior (Apr. 15, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.).  For an argument that a lengthy stay as a refugee in a country may 
give rise to a right for permanent residency and even citizenship.  See Livnat, supra 
note 10. 
 136 File No. 6312/10 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Kav Laoved v. the 
Government (Jan. 16, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) 
(Isr.); see also Yuval Livnat, Refugees, Employers, and “Practical Solutions” in the High 
Court of Justice: Responding to HCJ 6312/10 Worker’s Hotline v the Government, 3 
MISHPATIM ONLINE 23 (2011) (arguing against the decision as providing insufficient 
protection to asylum seekers). 
 137 Cf.  File No. 1708/07 District Court (Tel-Aviv-Jaffa) Amon v. Minister of 
Interior (Sept. 25, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  
The district court, sitting as an administrative court, decided that a documented 
migrant worker who stayed in Israel 17 years with a permit did not acquire a right 
to residency in Israel.  It further ruled that the legislature did not grant the Minister 
of Interior discretion to grant permanent residency to documented migrant workers 
simply because of a lengthy stay in Israel.  A petition to the Supreme Court led the 
Court to convince the migrant to withdraw the petition and request residency based 
on marriage in common-law with an Israeli citizen.  File No. 8947/08 
Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Amon v. The Minister of Interior (July 1, 2010), 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  The Court noted, without 
expressing an opinion on the merits, that its decision did not prevent the Minister 
of Interior from adopting a procedure with regard to future cases of documented 
migrant workers who spend many years in Israel. 
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Moreover, in all of these decisions, none of the Justices suggested 
that the duration of stay impacts the constitutional duties that the 
State may owe to these people.  The State owes greater constitutional 
obligations to those whose presence is tolerated longer, even if they 
are not regularized or officially admitted.  After all, by not resolving 
their legal status earlier, the State contributed to their presence and 
the formation of various types of reliance interests in their ability to 
continue to develop their lives in the country.  The State may have 
the least obligations to those who never entered it, while its 
obligations to those who reside in it—with or without formal legal 
status—expand as time passes.138 
Had the Court inferred any constitutional significance from the 
duration of stay, it would have escalated tension with the 
representative branches.  In fact, the policy of the government, 
which the Court has upheld in different cases, was one of two 
contradictory notions: 1) Migrants, whether documented or 
undocumented, should only be allowed to remain in Israel 
temporarily, so that they would not be allowed to claim rights on 
the basis of being firmly integrated into Israeli society; 2) Migrants 
who have remained in Israel for a long period of time, despite 
Israel’s policies to prevent such occurrences, cannot expect to be 
granted any rights on the basis of their long presence and integration 
into Israeli society.139 
In the cases on immigration detention, the State preferred that 
those who were present in Israel the longest—the first to arrive—
would move to the residency center first to prevent their integration 
 
 138 The Court offered these varying obligations of the State towards foreigners 
and those residing within its borders as a justification for the Law of Return.  “It is 
true, members of the Jewish nation were granted a special key to enter (see the Law 
of Return-5710–1950), but once a person is lawfully present as a citizen, he enjoys 
equal rights with all other household members.”  CA 6698/95 Ka’adan v. Israel 
Land Auth., 54(1) PD 258, 280-81 (2000) (Isr.); see Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 693 (majority 
opinion) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the 
United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law . . . 
It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons 
inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographical 
borders.”).  That the length of stay within a country matters is reflected in the 
immigration laws of various countries that make the passage of time a prerequisite 
for acquiring the status of permanent resident or citizen. 
 139 Livnat, supra note 10, at 369–76.  The policy is different with regard to 
migrants who come to Israel under the Law of Return and may immediately 
become Israeli citizens.  The Law of Return applies to Jews and their immediate 
family members. 
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into Israeli society.140  This follows a logic that is opposite to the one 
for which we are arguing.  It should be noted that, since the 
detention cases were decided after Israel had already erected a fence 
limiting further undocumented entry through its southern border, 
almost all of the persons subject to immigration detention or 
confinement in the residency center were people who had resided 
in Israel for a lengthy period of time.141  Distinguishing between 
undocumented people based on the length of their presence would 
have, at least, mitigated the infringement of their constitutional 
rights. 
Treating the undocumented entrants as one indistinguishable 
mix migration flow, a group composed of possible refugees as well 
as economic migrants, with both newcomers and oldcomers, led to 
harsh consequences in terms of their human dignity.  This group-
based approach prompted the Court to state that it does not matter 
who is placed in residency centers, as long as someone is, to reduce 
the burden on Israel’s disempowered neighborhoods.  The President 
of the Court, Miryam Naor, held in the majority opinion: 
I am of the opinion that realizing this purpose does not 
require holding any particular infiltrator in the residency 
center.  It is sufficient that a group of various infiltrators be 
held in the residency center.  Indeed, it is to be assumed that 
when one infiltrator is released from the residency center, 
another infiltrator will take his place.  I am of the opinion 
that this turnover between the infiltrators staying in the 
residence center and others from outside realizes the 
purpose of the Law.  It is sufficient that at any given time, 
part of the infiltrator population [ . . . ]  is removed from the 
urban centers.142 
This cannot possibly align with human dignity, which requires 
treating persons as an end, rather than a means, to promote broader 
social purposes.143  The Court has repeatedly held in other detention 
contexts that a person’s liberty cannot be compromised by the 
executive branch without criminal proceedings with full due 
 
 140 See, e.g., File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. 
Knesset, para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit, J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); id. at para. 52 (Vogelman, J., opinion). 
 141 See id. at para. 2 (Hendel, J., opinion). 
 142 Id. at para. 100 (Naor, Pres., opinion). 
 143 See HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov’t v. Knesset 61(1) PD 619 
(2006) (Isr.). 
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process guarantees, unless his individual actions justify detention to 
prevent danger to others or to prevent his flight from legal 
proceedings.144  A person’s liberty cannot be compromised to serve 
other social ends, important as they may be.145 
At the same time that the Supreme Court referred to 
undocumented entrants en masse, the lower courts referred to them 
in light of their individual traits, including their immigration story 
and the duration of their presence in the country.  This sometimes 
led the lower courts to take a braver stance than the Supreme Court.  
Such was the case, for example, in the decision of the Appeals 
Tribunal to grant temporary residence status to five Sudanese 
asylum seekers who had been in Israel for six to ten years and 
waiting for a decision on their asylum application for over a year.146  
A second set of cases involved persons from Darfur, who waited 
four to five years for a RSD decision, and were not included in the 
list of 500 Darfurians eligible for temporary residence status on 
humanitarian grounds.  In one decision, the Court ordered that the 
State should grant the asylum seeker temporary residency status 
and determine his RSD status within forty-five days.147  In other 
decisions, the Court instructed the State to grant the asylum seekers 
a temporary residency status, pending their security clearances.148  
All in all, the lower courts granted at least eighty-one Darfurians 
temporary residence status until the State decides on the merits of 
their asylum request.149  In a different form of intervention, the 
Appeals Tribunal granted an Eritrean asylum seeker, whose asylum 
 
 144 See, e.g., CrimA 7048/97 John Does v. Ministry of Def. 54(1) PD 721, para. 
19 (2000) (Isr.) (Barak, Pres., opinion). 
 145 See id. at para. 17. 
 146 See File No. 4447/17 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 147 See File No. 4117/17 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Feb. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 148 See e.g., File No. 1893/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), M.O.M.A. v. 
Ministry of Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 7, 2018), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 2887/18 Appeals Tribunal 
(Jerusalem), N.M.A. v. Ministry of Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. 
(Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); File No. 
3351/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), A.A.A. v. Ministry of Interior-Population 
and Immigration Auth. (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 149 See File No. 2887/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), N.M.A. v. Ministry of 
Interior-Population and Immigration Authority, para. 16 (Mar. 6, 2018), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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application was pending for more than five years, a work permit for 
a period of three weeks.  After this initial period, he would be 
granted temporary residency status unless the State rejected his 
asylum application.  This holding was based on the State’s 
unreasonable delay in examining his asylum application.150 
These different judicial attitudes might be related to the fact that 
the lower tribunals’ decisions are narrower and more case-specific 
than those of the Supreme Court.  This may explain the lower courts’ 
willingness to take into account the duration of a person’s presence 
in the country or the duration of his waiting for a decision.  By doing 
so, the lower courts do not create widely applicable precedents.  
Another potential explanation may be that the lower courts’ 
decisions are not as widely publicized.  They are also administrative 
decisions, which lead to the annulment of administrative decisions, 
rather than constitutional decisions that might lead to the 
annulment of legislation.  As there are no teeth comparable to those 
of a constitutional case, or even a generally applicable Supreme 
Court case, and since it was possible to appeal these administrative 
decisions, they did not trigger the kind of confrontation with the 
representative branches that Israeli society has witnessed with 
regard to Supreme Court cases dealing with the detention of 
undocumented entrants.  Moreover, the Supreme Court even 
reversed lower courts’ decisions on occasion, preventing asylum 
seekers from receiving interim status until their asylum applications 
were decided.151  Thus, the Supreme Court was not just exercising 
judicial restraint on its own; it was also enforcing such restraint on 
the lower courts, possibly for the above-mentioned institutional 
reasons. 
 
 150 See File No. 2376/18 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem), John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (July 29, 2018), (on file with authors) 
(Isr.). 
 151 See File No. 2317/19 Appeals Tribunal (Jerusalem) John Doe v. Ministry of 
Interior-Population and Immigration Auth. (Apr. 2, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); see also Merav Ben Zeev & Nimrod Avigal,  No Home, 
No Law—The Forgotten Story of the Refugees from Darfur, HAMISHPAT ONLINE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS (June 4, 2019) (Isr.), http://zola.colman.ac.il/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/89_3benzeev_avigal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VA6-
94ZP]; but see File No. 4331/19 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Adam v. The State 
of Israel-Population and Immigration Auth. (July 28, 2019), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (allowing asylum seekers to receive interim 
residency as they await the determination of their status by authorities). 
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2.3.2. The International Law Dimension 
The duration of a stay in a country is not just relevant from a 
constitutional point of view but also from the point of view of 
international law.  Under International Refugee Law, the longer the 
presence of a person in a country, and the more substantial his or 
her bond with the country, the more rights he or she is entitled to 
enjoy.152  While the basic right of protection from refoulement to a 
territory, where a person’s “life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion,” 153  is granted to anyone who is 
subject to the State’s jurisdiction and alleges to be a refugee (until 
decided otherwise),154 the rights to freedom of movement, 
engagement in self-employment and protection against expulsion 
apply to anyone who is “lawfully present.”155 
The interpretation of the term “lawful presence” and the rights 
that derive from this status are one of the instances in which a 
significant gap exists between states’ practices and international 
human rights law.156  Many countries do not grant rights to refugees 
until they affirm that these people are entitled to such treatment, 
despite the mere declarative nature of determining refugee status.157  
Many states are further unwilling to grant the protection against 
expulsion, until they grant refugees the right to remain in the 
country indefinitely.158   Some states even treat refugees, who enter 
them in a documented manner, as not “lawfully present” until 
officially recognized as refugees.159   These states’ practices do not 
 
 152 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 154–92. 
 153 Refugee Convention, supra note 8, art. 33(1). 
 154 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 159–60. 
 155 See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, arts. 18, 26, 32.  At a higher level of 
attachment to the country, that of “lawful stay,” the person may be entitled to 
additional rights, including wage-earning employment, practice of profession, 
freedom of association, and travel documentation, among others.  See Refugee 
Convention, supra note 8, arts. 15, 17, 19, 28. 
 156 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 173–77; see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & 
JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 524–25 (3d ed. 2007). 
 157 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 158–59; see also GOODWIN-GILL & 
MCADAM, supra note 156, at 524–25. 
 158 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 173 n.97. 
 159 See, e.g., HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 175–77 (describing a British case in 
which the Court held that a person who was temporarily admitted was not lawfully 
present).  By “documented entry,” we mean that the entry was in accordance with 
the law governing the entry to the country—typically through an official border 
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accord with the Refugee Convention. They collapse the distinction 
between “lawful presence” and “lawful stay” upheld in the Refugee 
Convention. Lawful stay grants more Convention rights to the 
refugees.160  We join James Hathaway’s position in arguing that 
“lawful presence” should be interpreted to cover not just those 
whose entrance was documented, but also those who are 
undergoing a RSD process (after submitting their application and 
complying with the formalities necessary to that end), or are 
protected under temporary protection regimes.  It covers people 
who present a form of authorization that falls significantly short of 
an ongoing permission to remain in a country.161  The passage of 
reasonable time leads to the acquisition of rights, when the state 
neither processes asylum applications nor expels, since it expresses 
the implicit acquiescence of the state in the presence of the person 
and his or her prima facie entitlement to refugee rights. He or she 
becomes lawfully present in the state. This interpretation may find 
some support in discussions held during the drafting of the Refugee 
Convention.162 
Such an interpretation is supported by the Celepli v. Sweden case 
from 1991.163  In this case, it was established that a rejected asylum 
 
checkpoint—while carrying identifying and valid travel documents and entry 
permits, where applicable. 
 160 At the higher level of attachment to the country, that of “lawful stay,” the 
person may be entitled to additional rights, including wage-earning employment, 
practice of profession, freedom of association, and travel documentation, among 
others.  See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, arts. 15, 17, 19, 28. 
 161 HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 180–82. 
 162 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 175, 659–67.  Compare U.N. ESCOR, 1st 
Sess., 15th mtg. ¶ 109, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.15 (Feb. 6, 1950), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aa1d5f2.html [https://perma.cc/XXS2-
Q4FQ] (recording that the French representative Mr. Rain has mentioned that, “any 
person in possession of a residence permit was in a regular position.  In fact, the 
same was true of a person who was not yet in possession of a residence permit but 
who had applied for it and had the receipt for that application.  Only those persons 
who had not applied, or whose application had been refused, were in an irregular 
position.”) with id. ¶ 108 (recording that the U.S. representative Mr. Henkin has 
recognized that “persons subjected to these restrictions [on movement but regularly 
admitted to the country] should nevertheless be considered, for purposes of the 
future convention, to have been regularly admitted.”). 
 163 A 1991 case, Celepli v. Sweden, may support a broad interpretation of the 
term “lawful presence.”  Sweden granted Celepli, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish 
origin, a right to stay in the country, even though it denied him refugee status.  
Sweden later suspected that Celepli was involved in terrorism and issued an order 
for his expulsion.  It was never executed for fear of Celepli’s persecution if Sweden 
were to return him to Turkey.  However, this order imposed severe limitations on 
his movement.  Celepli argued in front of the Human Rights Committee that 
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seeker, whom Sweden did not remove on humanitarian grounds, is 
“lawfully present” for the purposes of the ICCPR.  Thus, a similar 
argument may be made in the context of the Refugee Convention 
regarding persons whose asylum applications have not yet been 
determined.164  Lawful presence should only terminate if and when 
the state makes a final determination (after all appellate processes 
have been exhausted), to either not recognize a person as a refugee 
or revoke refugee protection (in accordance with Article 1(C) of the 
Refugee Convention in a particular case).165 
Even if this interpretation of the term “lawful presence” is 
rejected, at the very least, countries in which RSD processes are not 
fully functioning—whether it is because they are suspended for a 
certain period or with respect to a certain group of asylum seekers 
or because they are not fairly administered—must respect the rights 
of all asylum seekers as though they are, in fact, lawfully present 
refugees.  Put differently, choosing not to conduct fair and effective 
refugee status verification processes does not authorize 
 
Sweden violated his human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), including the right to liberty of movement enjoyed by 
“[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State.”  The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee found that Sweden did not violate Celepli’s rights.  U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., Celepli v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991, ¶ 10 (July 
18, 1994), https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,51b6e7ad4.html 
[https://perma.cc/7NE9-3MDF].  “The Committee is of the view that, following 
the expulsion order, the author was lawfully in the territory of Sweden, for 
purposes of article 12, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, only under the restrictions 
placed upon him by the State party [as the State argued].”  Id. ¶ 9.2. 
 164 See Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2003 (1) All SA 21 (SCA) para. 
37 (S. Afr.) (holding that, while South Africa may prohibit employment and study 
during the first 180 days after it issued a permit to sojourn temporarily pending the 
result of an asylum request, there might be individual cases in which the 
application of such a prohibition would be unconstitutional). 
 165 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 185–86; see also Rajendran v. Minister for 
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] 166 ALR 619 (Austl.) (holding that a 
person who entered Australia with a visa and enjoys a bridging visa will cease to 
be both lawfully present and able to invoke Article 32 of the Refugee Convention 
once his application for refugee status is rejected); C.I. v. Minister of Justice Equal. 
& Law Reform [2015] IECA 192, paras. 35, 40–44 (Ir.), 
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/0/0D275058CF2AFFD080257EC1004E1A01 
[https://perma.cc/W9BP-JG8J] (citing Nnyanzi v. U.K., 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2008) 
and Bensaid v. U.K., 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2001)) (holding that, after an asylum 
application was rejected, “it would require wholly exceptional circumstances to 
engage the operation of Article 8 in relation to a proposal to deport persons who 
have never had permission to reside in the State (other than being permitted to 
remain pending determination of an asylum application)” because the deportee’s 
right to remain in the country was always precarious). 
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governments to withhold refugee rights.166  Any other interpretation 
of the term “lawful presence” would allow refugees to be held 
hostage because of states’ decisions to refrain from fairly and 
adequately processing asylum applications. 
More concretely, if the undocumented entrants in Israel are 
lawfully present—as we would argue, until the State officially 
decides to deny them asylum in a fair process and on an individual 
basis—then this consideration must affect not only their freedom of 
movement but also their protection from expulsion.  Both of these 
rights are granted to persons who are lawfully present in a country.  
Protection from expulsion is much broader than protection from 
refoulement.  It limits states’ ability to expel a refugee anywhere (even 
to other places where they may find safety), with exceptions that are 
limited to national security and public order grounds.  Procedurally, 
expulsion requires due process before a competent senior 
authority.167  Prohibiting the expulsion of persons whose asylum 
applications were not fairly and timely processed is a matter of basic 
fairness.168  Different courts around the world have held, based on 
their obligations under domestic law as well as international 
law,that asylum seekers may remain in the country and cannot be 
expelled, pending the results of their applications for protection.169 
In the context of transfer agreements between the host country 
and third countries, this means that the ability to expel pursuant to 
third country agreements complies with international law only if it 
occurs before lawful presence is established (at which point Article 
32 governs and narrows the ability to expel).  States may only expel 
 
 166 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 184–85. 
 167 See Refugee Convention, supra note 8, at §§ 32–33 (detailing the 
requirements for expulsion and the prohibition of refoulment); HATHAWAY, supra 
note 100, at 669–73 (explaining that exclusion requires legal due process, though 
not necessarily judicial review). 
 168 See HATHAWAY, supra note 100, at 667. 
 169 For example, see, e.g., Arse v. Minister of Home Affairs 2010 (7) BCLR 640 
(SCA) (S. Afr.), holding the detention of the applicant unlawful because, under 
domestic South African law, notwithstanding any law to the contrary: no 
proceedings may be instituted or continued against any person in respect of his or 
her unlawful entry into or presence in the country if that person has applied for 
asylum . . . until a decision has been made on his or her application and that person 
has had an opportunity to exhaust his or her rights or [sic] review or appeal.  See 
also Case C-534/11, Arslan v. Czech, 2013 E.C.R. (May 30, 2013) (holding that if a 
person applied for asylum after he was detained and ordered to be removed, then 
the state must determine his application status before removal is possible.  The state 
may continue to detain him, if authorized under national law, when necessary to 
prevent his evasion of removal proceedings.). 
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a refugee claimant to a safe third country (subject to its obligation to 
non-refoulement directly or indirectly) during the early stages of the 
refugee claimant’s arrival in its territory—before the person applies 
for recognition as a refugee or complies with the formalities of the 
RSD.170 
To conclude, the Court has courageously protected the 
constitutional rights of undocumented entrants, but it missed the 
opportunity to bring the representative branches to accountability 
with regard to the most important issues on their agenda.  It did not 
require the State to decide the refugee status of these people in a 
timely manner, nor did it accord the entrants, on an interim basis, 
rights accruing to them as a result of a lengthy presence in the 
country. 
3. A HIGH STAKES CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
At the same time, the Court also employed various other 
strategies to reduce the conflict with the other branches of 
government.  With each invalidation of immigration detention, the 
Court encountered increasing criticism that questioned the 
legitimacy of its authority to strike down primary legislation as 
unconstitutional, especially in the immigration context.171  The 
constitutional dialogue turned into a constitutional struggle.  As an 
act of institutional self-defense, the Court applied constitutional 
avoidance, sectioning of laws, and babysitting and delaying 
techniques in an attempt to downplay its own judicial activism. 
3.1. Using Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine 
Over the course of the litigation on immigration detention, the 
legislature revised the three-year detention period (invalidated in 
Adam) to a one-year detention scheme (invalidated in Eitan) and 
then revised it again to a three-month period (upheld in Desta).172  
Although the Court required the legislature to explicitly make the 
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viability of removal a precondition for the constitutionality of 
detention in the Eitan case,173 the legislature did not comply.  It only 
shortened the detention period from one year to three months.174  
Rather than invalidating this three-month detention scheme, the 
Court upheld it in Desta by reading an implicit link between 
detention authority and the possibility of removal into the statute, 
determining that if the executive branch finds that it cannot remove 
a person, then it must release that person immediately.  The Court 
preferred to “save” the statute from invalidity through this 
interpretation since this interpretation was a lesser intervention in 
the legislative function.175 
However, the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which instructs 
courts to prefer an interpretation that does not lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality, only applies when such an interpretation does 
not rewrite the statute.176  It is questionable whether the Court’s 
interpretation in Desta abused the legislative language and intent.  
This questionability is revealed when considering the Court’s 
treatment of stare decisis in the case at hand.  The Israeli Supreme 
Court does not typically treat stare decisis as a substantial constraint 
on its decisions.177 
Nonetheless, Desta stands out, even against this background, 
since the Court deviated from its own prior ruling within a year.  In 
the Eitan decision, the Court held that it may not read an implied 
condition, that the authority to detain is contingent on the possibility 
of removal, into the immigration detention statute.  The Court thus 
required the legislature to make this condition explicit.  One year 
later, after the legislature rejected this requirement, the Court read 
this condition into the statute anyway, through interpretation, in the 
Desta case.  Of course, one may accept the Court’s explanation that 
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it is easier to read this condition into the statute when the legislature 
shortened the immigration detention period from one year to three 
months.178  But, on the other hand, the Desta Court did not heavily 
weigh this explanation against the counter-argument: that not only 
had the legislature shortened the immigration detention period, but 
it had also considered whether to make an explicit link between 
detention authority and the possibility of removal and decided 
otherwise.  Stare decisis is intended to provide stability to the legal 
landscape, protect the public’s reliance and expectation interests, 
but no less, strengthen the legitimacy of the judicial decision-making 
authority.  Yet, presumably for its own institutional preservation, 
the Court deviates from its own general reasoning on stare decisis. 
When constitutional avoidance through interpretation amounts 
to rewriting a statute, the infringement on the legislative power is 
greater than a finding of unconstitutionality.  The Court’s decision 
may materially affect the remedies of the parties to the case.  If the 
Court interprets the statute in a robust way that aligns with the 
petitioners’ rights, then the petitioners receive their remedies 
immediately.  If, on the other hand, the Court finds such an 
interpretation impossible and declares the statute inoperative, then 
the petitioners might have to wait for the legislature to act in order 
to address their grievances.179 
The Court’s decision might hinder the legislature’s ability to 
respond to the judicial ruling.  When a court declares a statute 
inoperative, the void might spur the legislature to gather the 
necessary majorities to draft a different legislative scheme.  But, the 
forces of inertia and “veto-gates” operate differently when a 
statutory arrangement remains intact and the legislature merely 
needs to amend the statute in response to a judicial interpretation.180 
No less important, when a court invalidates a statute, its decision 
resonates throughout the political arena and is thoroughly 
discussed.  Thus, the courts carefully analyze whether to embark on 
such a costly course of action or not.  If they issue too many judicial 
invalidations, then structural changes to the courts’ jurisdiction and 
power may result.  In contrast, no similar constraints operate to 
restrain the courts from adopting robust interpretation of statutes.  
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Frustrating the legislative will through interpretation is always a 
matter of judgment. 
It is true that, during the judicial proceedings in Desta, the State’s 
attorneys suggested that the Court adopt an interpretation that 
would render striking down the law for a third time unnecessary.181  
But, these legal representatives are a part of the executive branch, 
and their afterthoughts in front of the Court do not replace an 
accurate account of the legislative language and will when enacting 
the statute. 
3.2. Sectioning to Reduce the Appearances of Judicial Activism 
The Court held that it had only invalidated the immigration 
detention laws twice,182 though in all three cases—Adam, Eitan and 
Desta—the result was the invalidation of the laws or parts thereof.183  
One possible explanation of this miscount could be that, within the 
three cycles of litigation, the Court struck down the section 
providing for prolonged immigration detention twice and struck 
down the confinement to the residency centers twice.  The Court 
counts the third time that it struck down the detention statute as a 
second instance of nullifying the law because it separates the 
different sections that it struck down. 184 
The sectioning of the law is far from convincing since the 
different sections of the law do not stand independently of each 
other.  The residency center was created in response to the Adam 
decision, as a complementary means of confinement, as the 
legislature had reduced the detention period to one year.  Clearly, 
the legislature linked the decrease in the detention period to the 
possibility of confinement in residency centers, and the Court failed 
to acknowledge this. 
This façade enabled the Court to avoid explicit dealing with the 
heavy implications of its decisions: the fact that the legislature was 
violating constitutional and international law norms three times, 
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within a two-year period, with regard to the same group of people, 
and on the same issue. 
3.3. Delaying Decisions and Babysitting Techniques 
The Court decided the cases on immigration detention rather 
quickly, within a few months, in a manner befitting cases that deal 
with the right to liberty.  In other cases involving the rights of 
undocumented entrants, the Court took several years to reach a 
decision.  In many of these other cases, the Court held several 
hearings and attempted to see if the passage of time would resolve 
the issue or if the parties would reach an agreement in the shadow 
of legal proceedings.  For example, the Court took two years to 
decide whether the State may use the old Infiltration Law to detain 
undocumented entrants from Sudan, even though the statute did 
not provide for judicial review.185  During those years, the Court 
pressured the State to introduce some civil mechanisms of judicial 
review into the old law but eventually codified a compromise under 
which the government committed to review immigration detention 
under the Law of Entry into Israel.186 
The judicial tactics of delay and babysitting were also manifest 
when the Israeli Army “pushed back” undocumented entrants who 
were attempting to enter Israel through its border with Egypt.  The 
Army either prevented their entry or coordinated their return to 
Egypt within a short interval.187  It took the Court nearly four years 
to deliver a decision on this policy.  During those years, the Court 
pressured the government to introduce improved procedural 
safeguards to the pushback mechanism instead of deciding whether 
the pushbacks were permissible under international and 
constitutional law.  These safeguards included the need to guarantee 
the safe return of these people and enable them to request asylum.188   
The Court ultimately rejected the petition as “theoretical” in 2011,189 
when the Israeli Army admitted to its inability to conduct 
 
 185 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 186 See HCJ 3208/06 4 Anonymous Parties v. The Head of the Operations 
Division in the Israeli Defense Forces (Oct. 7, 2008) (Isr.). 
 187 See File No. 7302/07 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Hotline for 
Refugees and Migrants v. Minister of Def., para. 1 (July 7, 2011), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 188 See id. at paras. 5–11. 
 189 Id. at para. 12. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3
2019] African Undocumented Entrants in Israel 89 
coordinated pushbacks with Egypt after the overturn of the 
regime.190  After delaying the decision for so long, the Court found 
it sufficient to say that it assumes “that if and when the policy of 
returns to Egypt is renewed . . . it would be implemented in 
accordance with acceptable standards of international law, and with 
adequate guarantees to insure in a high level of certainty the safety 
of those returned.”191  The Court refrained from providing any 
further guidance to the State on which legal constraints restrict its 
ability to conduct such pushbacks. 
A third example may be found with regard to the right to access 
food when at the residency center.  When the State prohibited 
undocumented entrants from bringing food into the residency 
centers and prevented self-cooking in them, the Court took nearly 
two and a half years to reach a decision.  While the petition was 
pending, the Court attempted to persuade the government to 
concede.192  The petitioners submitted the petition in the midst of the 
religious fast of Ramadan and argued that they lacked access to food 
items necessary for the observance of the religious holiday.  
Nonetheless, the Court delayed a decision on the merits. 
A fourth, and the most important, example has to do with 
principled petitions challenging the State’s failure to conduct fair 
and effective RSDs for Sudanese asylum-seekers’ applications.193  
These petitions have been pending before the High Court of Justice 
for about two years to date, as the Court has preferred to grant 
deference to the State to come up with solutions.  The State, on the 
other hand, has continued to submit occasional updates to the 
Court, initially suggesting that a policy on these asylum applications 
is about to be formed and applied194 and then finally suggesting that 
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RSD reviews for Sudanese asylum-seekers should be halted in light 
of the political changes in Sudan.195  Throughout this period, the 
Court has acted as a “babysitter,” allowing the State to drag its feet 
and granting a number of extensions.  The Court has been granting 
these extensions, even though its decision to refrain from 
acknowledging that at least some of the Sudanese asylum-seekers 
meet the definition of “refugees” has had immediate and harsh 
consequences for them.196 
This growing tendency of the Israeli Supreme Court to serve as 
a “babysitter,” guiding the authorities to arrive at a solution that the 
Court perceives to be palatable, is not subject-specific.197  The Court 
tends to “babysit:” (1) in situations in which rendering a decision, 
rather than reaching a compromise, would lead to results that are 
less “just”; (2) in cases that are politically sensitive, in an effort to 
avoid a conflict with the other branches of government; and (3) in 
complicated matters, in an attempt to reduce the Court’s intense 
workload and avoid the need to write lengthy decisions.198  In the 
context of the various decisions on the rights of undocumented 
entrants, this strategy has led to prolonged infringements on the 
human and constitutional rights of these individuals. 
In conclusion, the Court’s use of constitutional avoidance, 
sectioning of the law, and delay and babysitting techniques have all 
contributed to the failure of the Court to bring the political branches 
to account in refugee matters. 
4. STRATEGIC USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
The Israeli Supreme Court has relied heavily on comparative 
law in its various decisions on undocumented entrants’ rights.  It has 
seemingly taken for granted that it was legitimate to use 
comparative law as part of its reasoning.  It further assumed that this 
reliance enhanced the legitimacy of its decisions in the eyes of both 
Israelis and the international community.199  At times, the Court has 
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used comparative law to portray Israel as a state that shoulders its 
part in the global refugee crisis and faces challenges similar to those 
encountered by other countries.200  At other times, the Court 
presented the Israeli struggle with undocumented entry as unique, 
either because of its geographical circumstances,201 or because of 
political, economic and demographic considerations.202  But there 
were shortcomings to the use of comparative constitutional law, 
since distinguishing factors were not given adequate weight. 
4.1. Employing Strategic Comparisons 
The global tendency to refer to comparative law and states’ 
practices in the context of immigration and refugee law is well-
documented.203  Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs argue that often 
the judicial reliance on comparative law is strategic, aiming to 
achieve inter-judicial cooperation in order to “stand up to the 
domestic political process without incurring the ‘costs’ of increasing 
the numbers of refugees.”204  Benvenisti argues that courts refer to 
comparative legal sources in order “either to bolster their respective 
domestic political processes or to withstand what they view as a 
coordinated intergovernmental assault on their independence.”205  
This can explain the Israeli Court’s use of comparative law in the 
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context of undocumented entrants as well.  The Court has 
presumably resorted to comparative law to increase its legitimacy in 
light of the institutional de-legitimation it has endured.  The 
representative branches harshly criticized the Court as protecting 
the rights of undocumented entrants and frustrating the will of both 
the legislature and government. 
The Court conducted comprehensive reviews of comparative 
law to both uphold and strike down governmental policies towards 
undocumented entrants.  For example, in the Desta case, the Court 
used comparative law for both purposes.  It determined that a three 
months detention period was constitutional, because it aligned with 
comparative practice.206  It further held, based on comparative 
practice, that a twenty-month mandatory residence stay in a 
designated center was unconstitutional.207  In Zegete, the Court 
referred to comparative law to uphold third country agreements, 
which allow supposedly “voluntary” removals of undocumented 
entrants to third countries.208 
The Court thus used comparative law as an “immunization 
device” that foresees possible criticisms and attempts to 
preemptively respond to them.  These criticisms may come from 
both those who believe the Court was overtly activist (critique from 
the “right” or the authorities) as well as from those who believe it 
was insufficiently protective of rights (critique from the “left” or the 
undocumented entrants’ civil society organizations). 
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4.2. Comparing the Incomparable: 1. Immigration Detention 
The Supreme Court reached its conclusion regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the detention period in all three cases based 
inter alia on the U.S. Supreme Court case, Zadvydas v Davis.209 
Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma had both entered the U.S. in 
a documented manner as children, at the age of 7 and 8.  Zadvydas 
held no additional citizenship.  As a result of criminal activity, the 
INS decided to deport each of them, but no country agreed to accept 
them.  Ma and Zayydas spent three and seven years, respectively, in 
detention centers before their cases reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 
When their hearings occurred, Zadvydas had resided for thirty-
seven years and Ma for sixteen years in the U.S.210 
The similarities between the Zadvydas and Desta cases are few 
and far between.  In both contexts, the courts were dealing with 
immigration detention.  In both, the courts expressed commitment 
to the notion that states should ultimately refrain from detaining a 
person who is not deportable.  In both, the courts shared a 
commitment to the constitutional avoidance canon, and preferred to 
“save” a statute from unconstitutionality through interpretation 
rather than resort to invalidity. 
However, the differences outweigh the similarities. In terms of 
the factual differences, the petitioners in Zadvydas were resident 
aliens who were convicted felons with final orders for their 
deportation.  In the Israeli cases, however, the persons at hand 
entered Israel in an undocumented manner and did not acquire the 
status of resident, yet except for a handful of persons, the 
overwhelming majority of them did not commit crimes and posed 
no danger to society.  The State did not decide on their refugee status 
and did not issue an order for their removal.  Each of these 
differences could and should affect in a substantial way the 
constitutionality of their respective detention. 
The normative holdings of the two cases are starkly different as 
well.  Under Zadvydas, during a removal period of ninety days 
provided in the statute, the INS may hold a person in detention, 
regardless of the person’s deportability.  Beyond the ninety days, the 
statute providing for detention should be read to avoid 
unconstitutionality, as limited to a judicially-constructed 
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“reasonable” detention period of six months.  Only after six months 
of detention, a person may provide good reasons to believe that 
there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, and then the government may rebut with 
evidence.211  However, in Desta, the Israeli Supreme Court did not 
permit even one day of detention, if the person cannot be deported. 
Furthermore, in Zadvysas, the Court emphasized that its reading 
into the statute to avoid unconstitutionality was made possible only 
because Congress did not explicitly authorize unlimited 
immigration detention.212  But, in Desta, though the Court required 
the legislature to make an explicit connection between detention and 
removal in its previous decisions, the legislature opted otherwise.  
Nonetheless, the Court read the requirement into the statute.  In 
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas explicitly limited the 
scope of its ruling to admitted persons.213  Israeli law does not use a 
similar distinction between admissible and non-admissible persons. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli Court relied on Zadvydas in Desta, which 
dealt with undocumented entrants, some of whom might (at least 
temporarily) be initially classified as inadmissible to the U.S. 
This interpretation of Zadvydas is reinforced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision of March 2018 in Jennings v Rodriguez.214  In Jennings, 
the Court held as a matter of statutory interpretation, without 
examining the constitutionality of the statute, that the INS is 
statutorily authorized to hold some types of undocumented entrants 
in detention without a bond hearing for as long as it takes it to reach 
a decision on the merits of their defensive asylum application.215  
The Court explicitly rejected the argument that asylum seekers may 
be released once they submitted their asylum applications.216 
There are some similarities, between the Jennings and the Desta 
cases, which are worth fleshing out. Rodriguez was a permanent 
resident of the U.S., convicted of a drug offense with a pending 
removal order.  He argued that he was entitled for a bond hearing 
as his removal order was challenged in court.217  In a similar 
 
 211 See id. at 701. 
 212 See id. at 689. 
 213 See id. at 682. 
 214 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 215 The affirmative asylum process is for individuals who are not in removal 
proceedings and the defensive asylum process is for individuals who are in removal 
proceedings. 
 216 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 846 (2018). 
 217 See id. at 838. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/3
2019] African Undocumented Entrants in Israel 95 
situation with him were persons who raised a credible claim for 
defensive asylum applications,218 whose circumstances were similar 
to those of the detainees in the Israeli Desta case.219 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Jennings adopted 
an interpretation of the statute that granted an implied right to 
periodic bond hearings every six months, to avoid 
unconstitutionality.220  The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, 
held that such an interpretation was contradictory to the plain 
language of the statute.221  The Court held that the Zadvydas ruling 
did not extend as far as requiring bond hearings in this type of 
immigration detention, primarily since the statute at hand used the 
words “shall,” rather than “may,” be detained.222  The Zadvydas 
reading-in of a limited detention period of six months cannot be 
applied since Congress expressly authorized detention until final 
decision, with no bond hearings, in these particular 
circumstances.223 
The Desta case also dealt with circumstances—in which the 
Knesset clearly intended to authorize prolonged immigration 
detention even when deportation was unavailable—which made the 
reading-in as odd as that conducted by the Ninth Circuit.  The Court 
in Desta presumably utilized constitutional avoidance due to 
“institutional survival” considerations, whereas in Jennings case, the 
Court refrained from using this approach, remanding the case and 
possibly triggering a constitutional analysis of the question. It 
should, however, be noted that the Jennings decision does not detract 
from the principle laid out in Zadvydas (and shared by Desta), which 
ties the ability to detain with deportability. 
The implications of the compilation of the two U.S. Supreme 
Court cases are that detention is limited in time after a final removal 
order (Zadvydas), but possibly prolonged pending an individualized 
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determination whether to remove a person at all (Jennings).  This 
“anomalous”224 result did not escape Justice Breyer, who exclaimed 
in a minority opinion: “Those whose removal is legally or factually 
questionable could be imprisoned indefinitely while the matter is 
being decided.  Those whose removal is not questionable (for they 
are under a final removal order) could be further imprisoned for no 
more than six months.”225  Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in 
Zadvydas, expressed similar frustrations in the opposite direction, as 
a reason why to indefinitely detain deportable aliens.226  The Desta 
case is located on a somewhat different plane, since it instructs to 
refrain from detaining persons, who are not candidates for removal 
(because of the temporary group protection afforded to them), even 
before there is a final individualized decision regarding their 
removal. 
The different circumstances could account, together with the 
political and institutional differences,227 to the different outcomes of 
the three cases.  In the circumstances of Jennings, the State has every 
interest to examine the pending applications with due efficiency. 
The statute thus assumed that asylum proceedings (not including 
appeal) ordinarily end within six months.228  By doing so, the state 
can cut down its own expenditures on immigration detention, as 
well as the risk to be found violating prohibitions of the Refugee 
Convention on limiting the freedom of movement of refugees and 
criminalizing their undocumented entry.  The risk of prolonged 
detention seems thus smaller, but it had nonetheless materialized, 
with some asylum seekers held in detention for more than two 
years.229  In this sense, it may very well be that the lower court was 
more protective of rights, just like the lower courts in Israel. 
 
 224 Id. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 225 Id. at 874. 
 226 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001). 
 227 A plausible interpretation of these conflicting results is the different 
composition of the U.S. Supreme Court.  When the Court decided Zadvydas, in 2001, 
it was easier for Justice Breyer to persuade his colleagues to join his relative liberal 
interpretation.  In 2018, Justice Breyer found himself in the minority of a Court 
composed of eight Justices (Justice Kagan took no part in the decision of Jennings). 
Another explanation may be that the Court decided Zadvydas before September 11, 
2001. 
 228 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 859 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 229 See id. at 860 (“The classes before us consist of people who were detained 
for at least six months and on average one year . . . The record shows that the 
Government detained some asylum seekers for 831 days (nearly 2.5 years) . . . Two-
thirds of the asylum seekers [detained] eventually received asylum.”). 
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The self-interest of the state in expeditious proceedings may not 
be assumed both in the Zadvydas and Israeli immigration detention 
circumstances.  In the absence of possibilities to execute a removal 
order, as in Zadvydas, states may prefer enduring the costs of 
immigration detention to releasing a person to society, whom they 
decided to remove.  This is especially true on a strategic level, since 
a state may fear that if other states knew that their refusal to accept 
deportees will lead to their release within it, this will incentivize 
other states to refuse to accept them.  In his dissenting opinion in 
Zadvydas, Justice Kennedy expressed a similar concern.230  In the 
Israeli immigration detention cases the state had no realistic option 
to remove the undocumented entrants, nor did it want to grant them 
refugee status, as discussed above.231  The detention period thus had 
no foreseeable expeditious end.  The State had further expressed its 
interest to exclude the undocumented entrants and deter future 
entries despite the high costs of detention.  However, in the Desta 
line of cases, unlike in Zadvydas, the State ran the risk of violating 
the Refugee Convention, by detaining possible refugees for their 
undocumented entry.232  It is precisely for this reason that the 
Court’s repeated intervention was so important, and why its failure 
to prompt an expeditious individual RSD determination was so 
unfortunate. 
The comparison between the Desta case and the Jennings and 
Zadvydas cases indicates that the differences between the cases are 
of such significance that it is clear that although the Israeli Supreme 
Court reached the right result in Desta, it definitely should not have 
relied on Zadvydas to legitimize its decision. 
4.3. Comparing the Incomparable: 2. Residency Centers 
In the Desta case, the Court also relied on comparative law to 
evaluate the proportionality of the limitations placed on the freedom 
of movement of undocumented entrants by placing them in a 
 
 230 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 711 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“The result of the Court’s rule is that, by refusing to accept repatriation of their 
own nationals, other countries can effect the release of these individuals back into 
the American community.”). 
 231 See supra Part 2. 
 232 Cf.  File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The 
Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.), 
with Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702. 
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residency center.233  The Court examined different policies of 
governments around the world toward asylum seekers, 
demonstrating that the use of residency centers was widespread and 
served the purpose of preventing the “mass influx,” as the Court put 
it, of cities.234  “‘Mass influx’ is not only measured quantitatively, but 
also relatively, inter alia, giving consideration to the state’s 
resources, and specifically its asylum system and its capabilities.”235  
President Naor wrote: 
The purpose of preventing settling in the urban centers—
which concerns easing the burden upon the urban center in 
which there is a significant concentration of aliens—. . . 
accords with the rules of international law. The interest in 
preventing the concentration of asylum seekers in certain 
cities stood at the base of various measures that restrict the 
freedom of movement of asylum seekers in Norway, 
Switzerland, Germany, and Kenya.236 
The Court further relied on the European Union’s directive that 
allows asylum seekers to be assigned to areas within the territory in 
which they enjoy freedom of movement.237 
The Court found, however, that while the purpose of the 
residency center was “proper,” the twenty-month mandatory stay 
in it did not pass the proportionality stricto sensu test (balancing 
harm resulting from infringement of rights and benefits derived 
thereof for the public interest): “The lengthy period established by 
the Law has no parallel in comparative law.”238  Typically, living in 
the residency centers is voluntary and intended to provide social 
benefits in comparative practice,239 but even when the stay is 
 
 233 At the time of the Desta decision, Israel placed 1,950 undocumented 
migrants in the residency center. 76% were Sudanese and the rest Eritreans.  Of 
them, 1,521 submitted requests for asylum.  Half of the submissions occurred while 
at the residency center.  The maximum period of stay in the center was 14 months.  
See File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para. 
55 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Naor, Pres., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.) (discussing the residency patterns and applications for asylum of the 
Holot residency center). 
 234 Id. para. 71. 
 235 Id. para. 73. 
 236 Id. para. 69. 
 237 See id. para. 70 (citing Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L31) 18 (EC); 
Directive 2013/33, 2013 O.J. (L180) 96 (EU)). 
 238 Id. para. 101. 
 239 Id. para. 101–5. 
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compelled, it is shorter.240  The President concluded: “To the best of 
my knowledge, no western country maintains residency centers that 
are not voluntary for asylum seekers  . . .  with the purpose of 
population dispersal.”241  This led the Court to shorten the 
maximum duration period allowed at the center from 20 months to 
one year. 
While the majority opinion acknowledged the differences 
between the Israeli residence center and comparative practice, it did 
not give enough weight to two additional factors.  The first is that 
many of the residency centers in other countries are dispersed 
throughout the country, including in the major cities, rather than 
located in an isolated desert, as in Israel.242  The Court equated 
dispersal with placing undocumented entrants in an isolated 
residence center.243  Only the concurring Justices emphasized this 
 
 240 See id. para. 101 (“Thus, for example, while asylum seekers in Germany and 
Switzerland are required to stay in a reception center upon arrival in the country, 
the period of that stay is only three months.”). 
 241 Id. para. 105. 
 242 See, e.g., Swiss Refugee Council, Types of Accommodation: Switzerland, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/switzerland/reception-
conditions/housing /types-accommodation [https://perma.cc/S27X-M7DJ] 
(highlighting the use of underground bunkers to raise reception capacity); 
Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, Types of Accommodation: Germany, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-
conditions/housing/types-accommodation [https://perma.cc/959F-5BSY] (“For a 
period of up to 6 months after their application has been filed, asylum seekers are 
generally obliged to stay in an initial reception centre (Aufnahmeeinrichtung).  An 
obligation to stay in these centres for a maximum of 24 months may be imposed by 
Federal States as of July 2017 although only Bavaria had made use of this provision 
until the end of 2017. Furthermore, asylum seekers from Safe Countries of Origin 
are obliged to stay there for the whole duration of their procedures . . . there is at 
least one such centre in each of Germany’s 16 Federal States with most Federal 
States having several initial reception facilities.”); ASGI, Types of Accommodation: 
Italy, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/reception-
conditions/housing/types-accommodation [https://perma.cc/3FF2-S6GY] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2019); Accem, Types of Accommodation: Spain, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/spain/types-accommodation 
[https://perma.cc/G6H7-XLSK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); Dutch Council for 
Refugees, Types of Accommodation: Netherlands, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands/reception-
conditions/access-forms-reception-conditions/types [https://perma.cc/3Y29-
J8K3] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 243 President Naor brought support for the residency center from UNHCR.  
“Even the U.N. Commission for Refugees—in its comments upon the bill for the 
Law that is the subject of these proceedings—recognized that dispersal of the 
asylum-seeking population among various cities is necessary in order to ease the 
burden upon the cities in which the infiltrators have concentrated.”  File No. 
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difference. Justice Amit wrote: “The Israeli model is unique, and in 
practice, it is not intended for population dispersion, as argued, but 
rather to concentrate the population in one facility that is remote 
from any settled area.”244  Justice Melcer similarly suggested that a 
previously attempted dispersion plan “would be preferable from 
the perspective of the Petitioners to that of a remote residency center 
surrounded only by sand and desert.”245 
The second is that while in other countries the residency centers 
typically hold recent arrivals,246 Israel prioritized those who have 
been in the country the longest to move to the residency center 
first.247  This difference should affect the test of balancing rights 
versus social interests: The infringement of the constitutional rights 
of the undocumented entrant is of a much smaller scope when the 
person has just recently entered the country and the state places him 
or her in a certain region, and much greater when the state uproots 
a person from a place of residence and integration of a few years. 
4.4. Comparing the Incomparable: 3. Third Country Agreements 
The Court used extensive comparative law to also legitimize its 
decision to uphold Israel’s confidential third country agreements.  
Under these agreements, Israel may remove undocumented 
entrants from Eritrea and Sudan to two countries, which will allow 
these migrants to reside and work.248  Under these agreements, Israel 
 
8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, para. 69 (Aug. 11, 
2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 244 File No. 8665/14 High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Desta v. The Knesset, 
para. 5 (Aug. 11, 2015) (Amit., J., opinion), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, 
in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 245 Id. at para. 9 (Melcer, J., Opinion).  For an elaborate plan to “disperse” 
asylum seekers in different parts of Israel, see Amir Alon, Business tycoons present 
asylum seeker integration plan, YNETNEWS (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5268553,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5QK-QP9H]. 
 246 See supra note 240. 
 247 See supra Part 2. 
 248 See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem) Zegete v. 
Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.).  According to the press, the two countries are Rwanda and Uganda, 
despite the two countries’ denials; see, e.g., Lee Yaron & Noa Landau, Israel Releases 
Asylum Seekers Jailed for Refusing Deportation to Rwanda, HAARETZ (April 4, 2018, 
10:57 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/uganda-no-deal-with-israel-
for-them-to-dump-their-refugees-here-1.5976136 [https://perma.cc/FR75-LSP7].  
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committed not to disclose the identity of these countries and to 
transfer undocumented entrants to these third countries only with 
their consent.249  Israel offered those consenting to removal, a 
monetary award of $3,500 USD,250 and announced that those who 
refuse the removal would be detained, until this policy was 
prohibited by the Court.251  Israel further committed to the Court 
that “at this stage” it will remove only undocumented entrants who 
did not apply for asylum or whose application it rejected.252  It 
further committed to remove those arriving last first, though most 
candidates for removal spent at least a few years in Israel.253 
The removal scheme evolved over time and resulted in several 
petitions and an appeal to the Israeli High Court of Justice, until the 
State effectively nullified it when the third countries backed out of 
the agreement.  As a result, the Court decided only the first 
challenge regarding the third country agreements and rendered the 
rest of the petitions redundant with the nullification of the 
agreement.254 
The Court held that there is “almost universal consensus” that a 
state has the authority under international law to remove 
undocumented entrants to safe third countries based on an 
 
This is also supported by the testimonies of those who the State removed to the 
third countries.  See Ruvi Ziegler, Benjamin Netanyahu’s U-turn: no redemption for 
asylum seekers in Israel, THE CONVERSATION (April 9, 2018, 8:43 AM), 
http://theconversation.com/benjamin-netanyahus-u-turn-no-redemption-for-
asylum-seekers-in-israel-94441 [https://perma.cc/V2A3-9QDH]. 
 249 See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Zegete v. 
Minister of the Interior, para. 3, 33, 117 (Aug. 28, 2017) (Naor, Pres., Opinion), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
 250 See id. para. 6. 
 251 See id. para. 5. 
 252 Id. para. 5. The later deportation procedure from January 2018 did, 
however, specifically mention that PIA “will consider expanding the population” 
which might be removed to a third country, including persons whose asylum 
applications are pending.  See Third Country Removals Procedures, art. 3.4 (Jan. 30, 
2018), 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/third_country_deportation_procedure/
he/10.9.0005_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y9M-Q6PT]. 
 253 Id. para. 16. 
 254 See File No. 8101/15 Administrative Appeals (Jerusalem), Zegete v. 
Minister of the Interior (Aug. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in 
Hebrew) (Isr.).  One of the petitions required primary legislation to execute removal 
of undocumented migrants under the non-delegation doctrine. File No. 679/18 
High Court of Justice (Jerusalem), Avivi v. Prime Minister (Apr. 10, 2018) Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
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individual decision.255  The court stated, “There is no rule of 
international law that prohibits the transfer of asylum seekers to a 
third country.”256  Under international law, states may share the 
responsibility of processing applications for refuge and granting 
refugee status.  On the comparative level, third country agreements 
are widespread throughout the Western world, including Europe, 
Australia, the U.S., and Canada.257  In fact, “In the last decades, states 
have signed hundreds of third country agreements, most of them 
bilateral and a few multilateral, many of them by members of the 
European Union.”258  Neither international law nor internal law 
requires the State to obtain the consent of the undocumented entrant 
as a condition for his or her removal.259  The Court found that the 
confidentiality of the particular third country agreements was a 
hindrance to proper supervision of their execution. However, 
although it is extremely uncommon in third country agreements, the 
State successfully convinced the Court that it is able to supervise the 
execution of these agreements.260  The Court further held that the 
petitioners did not meet the burden of convincing it that these third 
countries were unsafe in light of the State’s data.261  Finally, the 
Court held that the State was not authorized to detain people in 
order to compel them to agree to their removal, since the particular 
third country agreements required that removal only be done with 
consent of the undocumented entrant.  Nonetheless, the State may 
detain a person for 60 days, as provided in the Entry to Israel Law, 
to enable his or her removal to a different country, but only if such 
an option of removal was at all feasible.262 
The Court conducted a massive investigation into international 
and comparative law to determine whether the practice of third 
country agreements is widespread.  Indeed, many countries have 
signed and implemented third country agreements.263  Yet the Court 
 
 255 Id. paras. 30–32, 38. 
 256 Id. para. 39. 
 257 See id. para. 37. 
 258 Id. para. 77. 
 259 See id. paras. 33–34, 115–17. 
 260 See id. paras. 79–103. 
 261 See id. paras. 56, 74.  The Court held that these countries were parties to the 
Refugee Convention, had UNHCR offices, and allowed the undocumented 
migrants access to their court system.  Id. paras. 86, 101. 
 262 See id. para. 124. 
 263 See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 156, at 390–408; HATHAWAY, 
supra note 100, at 659–95; Cathryn Costello, The Asylum Procedures Directive and the 
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failed to acknowledge or give proper weight to the major differences 
between the international practice of third country agreements and 
the agreement discussed in Zegete.  First, most third country 
agreements are intended to enable a state to shift the responsibility 
of conducting RSD to another country and apply to recent arrivals.  
The State cannot “relieve” itself of the responsibility, once the person 
becomes “lawfully present,” as was arguably done in the Israeli 
agreements.264 
Second, typically third countries have some kind of nexus with 
the undocumented entrant, whether it is his or her country of 
citizenship, residence, habitual residence, or even a country of 
transit.265  Thus, under the Directive of the European Union, the 
concept of a safe third country requires “a connection between the 
applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it 
would be reasonable for that person to go to that country.”266  This 
nexus is the reason for the expectation that the third country should 
share the responsibility for the immigrant, and it makes the transfer 
of the immigrant to the third country more reasonable, since there is 
a connection between the immigrant and that state.  It is also 
arguably fairer since it prevents “asylum shopping” on the 
immigrant’s part. 
In contrast to the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court to uphold 
these agreements, some courts around the world have struck down 
 
Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of 
International Protection?, 7 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 35 (2005). 
 264 See supra Part 2.3.2. 
 265 This has not, however, been Australia’s policy.  See Shani Bar-Tuvia, 
Australian and Israeli Agreements for the Permanent Transfer of Refugees: Stretching 
Further the (Il)legality and (Im)morality of Western Externalization Policies, 30 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 474–76, 486–88 (2018) (discussing Australia and Israel’s new policy 
against refugees regarding permanent transfer to countries in exchange for 
payment to the countries). 
 266 Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International 
Protection, 2013 O.J. (L 180), 80, 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Dve-2013-32-Asylum-
Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/894A-XM8S]. 
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third country agreements,267 or prevented their implementation268 in 
circumstances that would jeopardize the human rights of 
undocumented entrants.  Thus, despite taking a rather activist 
stance on some other immigration-related matters, the Israeli Court 
is lagging behind other courts who have taken a more activist 
approach on similar matters. 
Overall, this Part has shown that the use of comparative law and 
practice in the treatment of refugees must account for the differences 
as well as the similarities between different legal regimes to qualify 
as a legitimating factor of judicial decisions.  When differences are 
not addressed, it might reflect the failure of the courts to bring the 
political branches to accountability on the domestic as well as 
international levels. 
5. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Constitutional courts are often the players that protect the rights 
of asylum seekers and require the representative branches to abide 
by their international and constitutional obligations.  This dynamic 
is unfolding in the U.S., especially since the election of President 
Trump.  It has been part of Israeli politics and law since 2007.  These 
two countries have been influencing each other’s policies with 
regard to immigration and treatment of refugees.  It is thus 
worthwhile to study the human and legal drama accompanying 
Israel’s treatment of undocumented entrants.  It may serve as an 
important lesson for the U.S. 
Presumably, the Israeli Supreme Court has attempted to walk a 
fine line between protecting the rights of undocumented entrants in 
 
 267 See, e.g., Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (holding 
that Italy could not evade its responsibilities under the European Convention of 
Human Rights by relying on a bilateral agreement with Libya, and that intercepting 
ships at sea and preventing their arrival to Italy by returning asylum seekers to 
Libya may be a violation of the non-refoulement principle); Plaintiff M70/2011 v. 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration & Citizenship [2011] HCA 1, 32 (Austl.) (invalidating the Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship’s declaration of Malaysia as a country that Australia 
may remove asylum seekers to in order for Malaysia to process their asylum claims, 
partly because Malaysia was not a party to the Refugee Convention). 
 268 See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R (2011) 
(finding by the European Court of Human Rights that Belgium was in violation of 
its international obligations for transferring an asylum seeker to Greece under the 
Dublin II Regulation, even though Belgium should have known of the deficiencies 
of Greece’s asylum procedures). 
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strategically planned decisions, on the one hand, and preserving its 
own institutional legitimacy, on the other hand.  The Court made an 
effort to downplay its own activism and reduce the tension with the 
other branches of government by engaging in constitutional 
avoidance, sectioning laws to suggest that it had struck down fewer 
laws than it actually had, and delaying decisions to enable parties to 
strike a compromise.  It strategically used comparative law to 
anticipate and address critiques from all parts of Israeli society, 
when often the comparison did not adequately address the 
differences between legal systems.  This was most evident by the 
Israeli judicial reliance on Zadvydas.269 
The Court may have tried not to displease the different parties 
too much on this sensitive, ideological, conflict.  It strategically 
refrained from requiring the representative branches to make 
efficient individual RSD determinations as part of a binding 
constitutional decision.  It further refrained from inferring 
constitutional implications from the length of presence of 
undocumented entrants in Israel.  With these two moves, it tried to 
please the critics of the Court from the “right” by appearing as if it 
was deferring to the State on these matters, despite the fact that the 
State was determined to drag its feet on these issues.  It, nonetheless, 
courageously protected “core” constitutional rights of these 
undocumented entrants, thus responding to demands of its critics 
from the “left.” 
Leaving undocumented entrants in civil and political limbo 
carries a heavy cost.  It negatively impacts their ability to enjoy 
human rights and undermines society’s character, cohesiveness, and 
values more generally.  As the Trump administration is attempting 
to confer undocumented entrants from the Mexican border similar 
indeterminate status, the Israeli Court’s experience with judicial 
restraint should serve as a cautionary tale for the federal courts that 
will determine whether Trump’s asylum ban is upheld. 
The Israeli Court employed these avoidance methods based on 
strategic considerations.  However, they led to costs, both 
domestically and internationally, that outweighed the benefits to the 
Court, the representative bodies, and Israeli society.  The Court itself 
ultimately authorized putting undocumented entrants in a confined 
residency center based on their group characteristics rather than 
individual acts. 
 
 269 See supra Part 4.2. 
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The Court now enjoys little trust from all sides of the 
controversy, and political attempts to diminish its power—whether 
in general or in immigration matters—persist.  There are various 
legislative bills that attempt to constrain the Court’s judicial review 
power and grant the legislature a general override power that will 
overcome constitutional decisions.270  Israel still weighs different 
options to remove undocumented entrants to third countries or 
countries of origin, especially since Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a 
peace agreement ending a 20-year war.271  This state of affairs led 
Holocaust survivors and others in Israel to argue that Israel is 
shamefully mistreating refugees.  The Israeli society is torn over the 
issue of the desirable treatment of these undocumented entrants and 
how to understand their status, and it was the Court’s duty to 
demand that the representative bodies decide the merits of these 
important questions. 
Last but not least, while the political branches may have thought 
they could persuade the international community that these are 
economic migrants, the world views Israel with disdain for 
attempting to remove people that other countries treat as refugees.272  
This debate, in which different elements of Israeli society talk past 
each other, could have been conducted more constructively, if only 
this responsible adult—the Court—had required the representative 
bodies to decide who these people were.  By deciding this question, 
Israel would have also decided who it was. 
 
 270 See, e.g., Jonathan Lis & Revital Hovel, Right-Wing Ministers Unveil Bill to 
Let Knesset Override Supreme Court, HAARETZ (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-bill-would-let-knesset-
override-supreme-court-1.5629190 [https://perma.cc/4MD6-2DS3] (discussing the 
unlikelihood of the proposed Basic Law—a law that would allow the Knesset to 
reenact past overturned laws by the Supreme Court—to pass considering both sides 
of the coalition are currently withholding support); Stuart Winer & TOI Staff, In U-
Turn, Netanyahu Said to Reject ‘Extreme’ Draft of High Court Override Bill, TIMES ISR. 
(Apr. 15, 2018, 12:42 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-u-turn-netanyahu-
said-to-reject-extreme-draft-of-high-court-override-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/2HUQ-DA8M] (discussing the divide over limiting the power 
of the judicial branch). 
 271 See Lee Yaron, Israel Considers Deporting Asylum Seekers to Eritrea and Sudan, 
HAARETZ (July 24, 2018, 6:54 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-israel-mulls-deporting-asylum-seekers-back-to-eritrea-and-
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Asylum-Seekers, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2018, 2:05 PM), 
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